


KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

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U.S. Army

1ST BRIGADE

5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (M)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PREFACE

THE STANDDOWN OF THE "RED DEVIL" - "NORTHERN MOST" BRIGADE, THE ONLY MECHANIZED BRIGADE DEPLOYED ALONG THE DMZ IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, PRESENTED UNIQUE PROBLEMS TO COMMANDERS AND STAFFS AT EACH ECHELON WITHIN THE BRIGADE. THIS AFTER ACTION REPORT RELATES PRIMARILY THOSE EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEM AREAS WHICH OTHER UNITS MAY EXPECT TO FACE DURING INACTIVATION/REDEPLOYMENT. SOME "RED DEVIL" UNIQUENESS, HOWEVER, MANAGED TO SLIP THROUGH THE BIASED EDITORS.

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
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19 August 1971

SUBJECT: After-Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. On 19 August 1971, the "Red Devil" Brigade ended its mission in the Republic of Vietnam. During three years in combat, the Red Devils fought and defeated the best of the enemy units in RVN, and they endured the heat, dust, torrential rains and mud.
2. Redeployment presented yet another major task; one that posed unique problems to be overcome. First, no other unit had stood down while in contact with the enemy. This necessitated careful and detailed coordination with FWNAF for turnover of the Brigade TAOI. Secondly, the Brigade base camp was located over 100 road miles from the KEYSTONE center in Da Nang, where the Brigade turned-in 975 vehicles, including over 200 tracked vehicles. Thirdly, the remoteness of Quang Tri contributed to air transportation problems in shipping personnel from the Brigade. All of these problem areas were overcome as a result of the team effort put forth by the Brigade Staff and the officers and men of the Brigade units.
3. It has been an honor to command the Red Devil Brigade, and I wish each member "Good Luck and Godspeed."


HAROLD H. DUNWOODY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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3-CG, DMAC, ATTN: G3
5-CO, 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), ATTN: S3
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Camp Red Devil
APO San Francisco 96477

KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

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1. PURPOSE: This report reflects the actions taken to accomplish the redeployment/inactivation of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). The intention of this report is to provide assistance to other units planning to execute a similar type operation.
 2. MISSION: On 12 June 1971, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) was notified that it was a KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO) unit and it would redeploy from the Republic of Vietnam not later than 31 August 1971. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) immediately formed a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) and published the operation plan to commence standdown by phasing of units starting on 01 July 1971. The Brigade colors and subordinate unit colors were returned to CONUS for inactivation, with the exception of A Troop, 4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry, which was reassigned to XXIV Corps. Appropriate inactivation ceremonies were conducted at Fort Carson in conjunction with the selected Color Guards. The majority of the "Red Devil" Brigade personnel were to be reassigned in United States Army Vietnam (USARV).
 3. SITUATION:
 - a. Tactical: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) arrived in Vietnam on 02 July 1968, and placed under operational control of XXIV Corps. The 1st Brigade's area of operations (AO) encompassed Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Con Thien and Gio Linh with its tactical operation center located at Quang Tri Combat Base (Ai Tu), Quang Tri Province. Allied units operating in the area were the 1st Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, 3d Marine Division, and Regional and Popular Forces. In addition to conducting cordon and search missions, the 1st Brigade conducted strike operations in support of the pacification effort and conducted patrols and civic action projects in Quang Tri Province. Operations were designed to re-open Highway QL-9 to the Laotian border, to conduct reconnaissance in force, and search and clear operations on the Khe Sanh plain, and interdict Highway 926. The Brigade conducted various operations throughout Military Region I (MRL) to include: road building operations in the Ba Long Valley, locating and destroying the enemy and his caches in the valleys, rice denial and providing security for the friendly populace while the rice was being harvested and preventing NVA/VC access to the rice producing areas.
 - b. Planning: To plan and organize the "Red Devil" Brigade's redeployment, a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) was formed on 12 May 1971. The RPG consisted of representatives from each primary and special staff section, headed by the Brigade Executive Officer. The combined efforts produced the 1st Brigade's Operations Plan 183-70 (U) issued on 23 June 1971. Once

the OPLAN was completed an officer was designated as the Brigade Redeployment Coordinator. The coordinator and selected members of the RPG formed the Redeployment Control Center (RCC) to coordinate redeployment activities at all staff levels. The RCC continuously displayed and updated a series of progress charts and provided the management tools necessary for commanders to accomplish the redeployment. ANNEX A (RCC).

4. CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT:

a. Personnel and Administration: The primary task of the AG/S1 during redeployment was the reassignment of approximately 4500 Brigade personnel. The activities of the Chaplain, Provost Marshall, and Finance had to be concluded; all non-appropriated funds had to be transferred or closed; and records disposition had to be completed. For details of AG/S1 activities in connection with redeployment see ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration).

b. Intelligence: The Brigade S2 Section was required to dispose of classified material and turn-over sensors and equipment to the 1st ARVN Division. Details of these activities are at ANNEX C (Intelligence).

c. Tactical Concept:

(1) Withdrawal plans were formulated and units identified to assume responsibility for the area of operations. The order of withdrawal was based upon logistical feasibility, tactical necessity, and the availability of units to assume responsibility for the brigade TAOR.

(2) As the withdrawal date drew near, it was learned that the 1st ARVN Division, 147th ARVN Marine Brigade, and 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) would assume portions of the Brigade area of operation.

(3) On 25 June, the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor commenced withdrawal from Mai Loc, Quang Tri Province. The 147th Marine Brigade was positioned at Mai Loc, and occupied the FSB of 1st Battalion, 77th Armor on 25 June 1971. On 10 July, 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mechanized) was replaced at FSB A-4 by the 2nd ARVN Regiment and at FSB C-2 by the 11th ARVN Cavalry Regiment. On 11 July, the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry was replaced at FSB Anne by an element of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) completing the turn-over of the brigade TAOR. See ANNEX D (Operations).

d. Logistical Concept and Preparation: The problem facing the "Red Devil" Brigade S4 was to move a separate mechanized Brigade and its equipment from an active field combat configuration along the IMZ to Da Nang, clear and turn-in all real property and bulk supplies, billet and feed approximately 4500 members of the Brigade, and prepare and turn-in all TO&E and PC&S equipment in the Brigade. The accomplishment of these and the numerous related tasks called for prior planning, close monitoring and continuous supervision of the Brigade activities within the logistical spectrum. See ANNEX E (Logistics).

e. CA/PSYOPS: During redeployment, the Brigade S5 was required to complete, terminate, or transfer civic action projects and programs within

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the Brigade area of operation. See ANNEX F (Logistics).

f. Communications/Electronics: The 296th Signal Company was responsible for the phased turn-in of their organic communications equipment while maintaining essential communications facilities in support of the Brigade during the redeployment period. See ANNEX G (Signal).

g. Engineer: The Engineer tasks were to continue normal combat support of those maneuver elements still committed to combat operations, prepare two combat bases and four fire support bases for closure or turn-over to allied units, and to prepare organic engineer equipment and recoverable engineer material for turn-in. See ANNEX H (Engineer).

h. Fire Base Transfer: The Brigade transferred four fire support bases (FSB) to US and ARVN forces. In preparation for the transfer, the Brigade's Engineer company conducted minesweeps of areas suspected to contain buried equipment, and levelled trash dumps. In addition, records of all known existing minefields in the Brigade TAOI were transferred in sets to XXIV Corps, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and 1st ARVN Division. (ANNEX H, Engineer) FSB transfers were accomplished on schedule as follows:

| <u>Date</u> | <u>FSB</u> | <u>Recipient</u> |
|-------------|------------|------------------|
| 25 Jun | Mai Loc | 147 VNUMC Bde |
| 08 Jul | A-4 | 2 ARVN Regt |
| 10 Jul | C-2 | 2 ARVN Regt |
| 11 Jul | Anne | 101st Abn Div |

i. Base Camp Turn-over: Five separate transfer plans were developed by the Brigade Engineer for the turn-over of Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases. These plans were necessitated by the fluidity of ARVN intentions for the Quang Tri area. As a result, the final turn-over and disposition responsibility for the two combat bases ultimately reverted to 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). A clearance control team was established consisting of representatives from the Brigade S4 and S2, Installation Coordinator and PA&E. As part of each unit commander's clearance procedure, he was required to certify that his area contained no buried government equipment or supplies. In some cases, material which had been buried for several years was discovered. In these cases, the unit commander was not required to excavate the equipment, but a record was made of the find. (ANNEX H, Engineer)

j. Ceremonies: Each battalion and separate company held an awards ceremony on the third day after start of its standdown. See ANNEX L (Ceremonies).

k. Battalion Problems: For comparison of problems faced and actions taken by the first and last maneuver battalions to standdown, the After Action Reports of the 1st Battalion 77th Armor and 1st Battalion 11th Infantry are at ANNEX M and N respectively.

1. Roll-up Force: Due to the remoteness of Quang Tri, a substantial roll-up force (RUF) was needed to facilitate final close-out of Brigade elements. The RUF was structured along functional lines to conduct final audits of property books, funds, mess accounts, and facility clearances. See ANNEX J (Roll-up Force).

5. Conclusion: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) accomplished its mission in RVN. The dedication to duty, professionalism, sacrifices and valor of its soldiers will be reflected in the military history of our great nation and will be a highlight in a proud chapter in the military heritage of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech). See ANNEX K (Historical Synopsis).

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ANNEX A (Redeployment Control Center) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO) (U)


1. Background: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) envisioned its redeployment in four phases: Phase I being the initial planning phase; Phase II, the notification and detail planning; Phase III, the execution phase and Phase IV, the roll-up phase.
2. Development: Approximately thirty days prior to receipt of redeployment notification, a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) as outlined in Appendix 1 was established. This group's primary task was to develop a plan for disengagement and a standdown schedule. The group further wrote and published the 1st Brigade's Redeployment Planning Guide on 6 June 1971 and OPLAN 183-70 on 23 June 1971. In addition, centralized control and an information center were deemed a necessity due to the magnitude and complexity of the redeployment task. This requirement was fulfilled by the establishment of the Redeployment Control Center (RCC), located in the Brigade TOC and manned by members of the Redeployment Planning Group.
3. Implementation: Once the RCC was activated, a series of charts displaying redeployment status were employed. These charts were briefed to the Commanding General on a daily basis and were also available for unit commander's inspection 24 hours a day. Examples of a few of the more important charts are: Redeployment Schedule at Appendix 2; Brigade Strength at Appendix 3; Unit Redeployment Status at Appendix 4; Personnel Out-processing Status at Appendix 5; Cumulative KEYSTONE pieces turned-in at Appendix 6; Unit Property Turn-in (for each category) at Appendix 7.
4. Functions: The Brigade Redeployment Control Center performed the following functions:
 - a. Provided a focal point to which units could turn-in daily reports and gain information and answers to their questions.
 - b. Formed the nucleus of the briefing team which presented all the briefings concerned with redeployment of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).
 - c. Collated and published all changes to the Brigade's operation order.

ANNEX A (Redeployment Control Center) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO) (U)

APPENDICES:-


- 1 - Redeployment Planning Group
- 2 - Redeployment Activities
- 3 - Brigade Strength
- 4 - Unit Redeployment Status
- 5 - Personnel Outprocessing Status
- 6 - Cumulative Keystone Pieces Turned-In
- 7 - Keystone Property Turn-in (For Each Category)

on



75 Spt (-)
48 PI Det

1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M)



STATUS OFFICERS WARRANT ENLISTED TOTAL

APPENDIX 4 (Unit Redeployment Status) to ANNEX A (Redeployment Control Center) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report
Keystone Oriole (Bravo)

1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

UNIT REDEPLOYMENT STATUS

7 AUG 71

YESTERDAY'S
LOSSES

TODAY'S
STRENGTH

STANDDOWN
STRENGTH

UNIT

| | | | | | |
|------------|-----|-----|----|--|--|
| HHC | | | | | |
| OFF | 50 | 35 | 2 | | |
| WO | 13 | 10 | 1 | | |
| EM | 380 | 264 | 13 | | |
| 75 SPT (-) | | | | | |
| OFF | 36 | 33 | 3 | | |
| WO | 5 | 5 | 0 | | |
| EM | 533 | 450 | 38 | | |
| 517 MI DET | | | | | |
| OFF | 5 | 0 | 2 | | |
| WO | 7 | 0 | 2 | | |
| EM | 36 | 0 | 19 | | |

APPENDIX 5 (Personnel Processing Status) to ANNEX A (Redeployment Control Center) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division's (M) After Action Report
 Keystone Oriole (Bravo)

PERSONNEL PROCESSING STATUS
 1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (M)

| | | |
|----------------------|----|-----|
| DAILY LOSSES | | 116 |
| IN COUNTRY TRANSFERS | | |
| OFFICERS | 9 | 8 |
| ENLISTED | 67 | 32 |
| TOTAL | 76 | 40 |
| YESTERDAY'S LOSSES | | 149 |
| DEROS | | |

| | | |
|----------------------|------|------------|
| CUMULATIVE LOSSES | | thru 7 AUG |
| IN COUNTRY TRANSFERS | | |
| OFFICERS | 75 | 116 |
| ENLISTED | 1778 | 1383 |
| TOTAL | 1853 | 1499 |
| CUMULATIVE LOSSES | | 3352 |
| DEROS | | |

BRIGADE EQUIPMENT TURN-IN STATUS

| ITEM | TOTAL O/H START | TOTAL TURNED IN TO DATE | TURNED IN TODAY | PERCENT TURNED IN | REMARKS |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------|
| Firepower | | | | | |
| Mobility | | | | | |
| Wheeled Vehicles | | | | | |
| Tracked Vehicles | | | | | |
| Weaponery | | | | | |
| Communications | | | | | |
| Radios | | | | | |
| Generators | | | | | |
| Night Vision Devices | | | | | |
| Others | | | | | |
| PCS Property | | | | | |
| Mess Equipment | | | | | |
| Billeting Equipment | | | | | |
| Office Equipment | | | | | |
| Others | | | | | |
| Special Purpose | | | | | |
| Engineer Equipment | | | | | |
| Water Purification Equipment | | | | | |
| Generator non Signal | | | | | |
| Others | | | | | |
| Special Services | | | | | |
| PMA Items not reported under AR 711-5 | | | | | |
| Temporary Loans | | | | | |
| VARP Loans | | | | | |
| Conexes | | | | | |

APPENDIX 6

UNIT EQUIPMENT TURN IN STATUS

| UNIT | WHEELED VEHICLES | TRACK VEHICLES | WEAPONS | COMMO ELECT | SPECIAL PURPOSE | OTHER MTOE | PCS | REMARKS |
|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------|-------------|-----------------|------------|-----|---------|
| 1-11 Inf | | | | | | | | |
| 1-61 Inf | | | | | | | | |
| 1-77 Arm | | | | | | | | |
| 5-4 Arty | | | | | | | | |
| 75th Spt | | | | | | | | |
| HHC 1/5 | | | | | | | | |
| P/75 Engr | | | | | | | | |
| A/7 Eng | | | | | | | | |
| 298th Sig | | | | | | | | |
| 517th MI | | | | | | | | |
| 43d Sct doct | | | | | | | | |
| 77 Flt (CBT) | | | | | | | | |
| 48th PLO | | | | | | | | |
| 86th Chem Det | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX 7

ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning personnel and administration operations conducted during the redeployment/inactivation of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

2. GENERAL: Redeployment/inactivation objectives were established to provide for:

a. Continuing personnel management and services to the brigade and necessary additional services to the personnel departing.

b. Uninterrupted finance services to all personnel of the brigade regardless of location and necessary additional services for redeploying personnel.

c. Military Police support to maintain order and discipline and strict traffic control at Quang Tri Combat Base during redeployment/inactivation of the Brigade and the turn-over of the installation.

d. Religious area coverage for all personnel during redeployment/inactivation.

e. Continued non-appropriated fund support for all unit funds and accurate and timely dissolution of those funds maintained by the redeploying/inactivating units.

3. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

a. Personnel would move by unit from assigned TAOR to Camp Red Devil or Camp Roberts for final out-processing, and the unit would retain responsibility for strength accountability until all personnel had departed.

b. The brigade replacement depot would be utilized as the final out-processing site.

c. Normal DEROS, curtailed personnel, and personnel immediately excess to Brigade's needs would out-process and depart Quang Tri Combat Base.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. The brigade replacement depot was selected as the final out-processing site because the facilities were familiar to members of the brigade and were large enough to process brigade personnel at the required rate. The replacement depot also had mess and billeting facilities for holdover personnel in the event scheduled air transportation was cancelled due to weather or technical difficulties. It was later decided, due to difficulty in obtaining air transportation to return personnel from Da Nang to Quang

ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

Tri for final out-processing, that the remainder of the Brigade personnel would out-process at Da Nang. On 9 August 1971, the brigade redeployment out-processing center opened at Freedom Hill R&R center and was operational by 1600 hours. Out-processing at the Brigade replacement depot, Quang Tri Combat Base, ceased operations at close of business 9 August 1971.

b. Organization and Planning:

(1) To maintain control over out-processing, units in standdown were required to submit day-by-day scheduling and by-name rosters of those personnel to out-process. This was also beneficial in maintaining a steady, continual out-processing of brigade personnel and provided a management tool for the commander.

(2) The final out-processing at the replacement depot operated similar to a replacement detachment. It included functions and personnel from Adjutant General, Finance, Military Police, and Medical.

c. Criteria:

(1) Normal DEROs, curtailed personnel, and personnel excess to unit requirements were out-processed at Quang Tri Combat Base.

(2) Personnel having 60 or fewer days until DEROs upon completion of their unit standdown period at Quang Tri Combat Base were eligible for curtailment of Foreign Service Tour. Personnel with 61 or more days remaining to established DEROs were reported to Headquarters, USARV for reassignment.

d. Brigade S-1 Operations:

(1) Adjutant General operations required extensive planning and coordination in order to successfully accomplish tasks attendant to re-deployment/inactivation of the Brigade. Adjutant General planning and functions are described in Appendix 1.

(2) Civilian Personnel activities phased-down as the Brigade strength decreased. Civilian personnel activities are described in Appendix 2.

(3) Unit nonappropriated funds and Mess funds were closed, audited, and the funds dissolved prior to departure from Quang Tri Combat Base. Funds and Mess activities are described in Appendix 3.

(4) Finance Activities are described in Appendix 4.

(5) Information operations are described in Appendix 5.

ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE CRIOLE (BRAVO)

(6) Military Police operations and support are described in Appendix 6.

(7) Religious coverage and support were provided by brigade and battalion chaplains as described in Appendix 7.

(8) The Staff Judge Advocate Section completed or transferred all cases pending, settled civilian and military claims, and conducted an orderly phase-down. Staff Judge Advocate functions are described in Appendix 8.

(9) The Brigade S-1 monitored the overall activities of the Special Staff Sections and worked closely with the Redeployment Control Center (RCC), to assist in matters peculiar to the redeployment/inactivation of the Brigade. The Brigade S-1 conducted normal operations and monitored the reporting of deployable unit strengths. Some officers from redeploying units were reassigned within the brigade to replace key individuals whose normal DEROS occurred during redeployment/inactivation. Specific release dates for officers of the Brigade Headquarters required considerable planning to insure gradual phase-down by section.

5. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Problem: Loss of key personnel within the Battalions and Brigade staff sections caused considerable turmoil early in the redeployment/inactivation of the Brigade. Key personnel lost due to normal DEROS were two Battalion Commanders, two Battalion XO's, two Battalion S4's, Brigade S1, Brigade S3, and Brigade XO. The Brigade did not receive replacements for these individuals and Brigade assets had to be utilized to fill the positions vacated.

b. Lesson Learned: It is vitally important that redeploying/inactivating units have qualified personnel familiar with the units operation, equipment and personnel to conduct an orderly and efficient standdown.

c. Recommendation: Upon notification of redeployment/inactivation immediate action be taken to retain such key personnel for an additional 30 days or USARV provide qualified replacements to the redeploying/inactivating units.

ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

8 APPENDICES

1. Adjutant General
2. Civilian Personnel
3. Funds and Messes
4. Finance
5. Information
6. Provost Marshal
7. Chaplain
8. Staff Judge Advocate

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APPENDIX 1 (Adjutant General) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: During the standdown period the Adjutant General's Office was tasked to:

a. Maintain unit strengths at prescribed levels during redeployment/inactivation.

b. Restrict personnel turbulence to the lowest possible level consistent with the redeployment/inactivation criteria.

c. Insure that a complete range of personnel services are provided throughout all phases of redeployment/inactivation.

d. Maintain the highest possible state of morale and esprit de corps throughout redeployment/inactivation.

e. Provide for the rapid processing of records, reports, and other administrative requirements.

f. While the Adjutant General was able to accomplish these missions without major difficulties, numerous minor problems plagued the effort. Consequently, this report, organized as personnel services, administrative services, and morale services, will attempt to enumerate the accomplishments of the Adjutant General's effort, to consider his problems, and to suggest alternatives to guide future endeavors.

2. PERSONNEL SERVICE: The personnel service division bore the brunt of the Adjutant General's mission in that it was tasked to organize the records and prepare the assignment for each member of the Brigade.

a. Personnel Management:

(1) Method of Operation: In-country assignment rosters were prepared IAW USARV Pamphlet 600-1 using unit rosters verified with individual qualification records. These rosters were taken to USARV by courier for appropriate action. Upon return of completed rosters, a concentrated team effort in preparing reassignment orders on pre-cut stencils resulted in the majority of the orders for battalion or separate company being published in one consolidation. An alphabetical orders log was maintained to identify individuals with particular orders and to control amendments. This log was posted with the individual's NAME, RANK, SSAN, UNIT, PMOS, Unit of Reassignment, Paragraph and SO number, and Availability Date. Ultimately, in-country out-processing rosters were prepared from the log.

(a) EER worksheets were forwarded to the units in company packets. Upon completion, these packets were forwarded to the Records

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Branch for posting on DA Form 20's and to the Personnel Management Branch for forwarding to CONUS. The same control deck used during normal operation, was used to determine which soldiers required EER's.

(b) The Redeployment criteria was applied to DEROS personnel by use of the DEROS control deck used during normal operation. These cards were segregated by unit and were organized chronologically by unit standdown date. The Pending Assignment Rosters and the DEROS Report were prepared by verifying control cards with copies of orders and copies of requests for orders.

(2) Problems: Preparation and coordination for standdown was initially delayed by over-classification of information necessary to meet personnel suspenses. Because the dissemination of information was restricted, the standdown was in full operation before adequate coordination was effected. Operations in some areas were never able to recover from the initial delay.

(a) Normal requirements during the planning phase and immediately prior to standdown precluded adequate preparation and instruction of personnel required to execute redeployment/inactivation.

(b) Units were precluded from submitting Personnel Rosters while redeployment/inactivation dates remained classified.

(c) The unit rosters, which were used as the data base, were difficult to manage because the AOR section and the in-country reassignment section had simultaneous requirements for the rosters.

(d) Personnel in several units did not understand the EER system within Vietnam and submitted EER's that were not required.

(e) Due to the short notice for standdown, the base defense requirements, and the volume of work, personnel pending DEROS were not identified early enough to insure receipt of all assignment instructions within the first thirty days of standdown. Although some DEROS personnel were available for out-processing early in standdown, they had to be retained pending receipt of assignment instructions from USARV.

(3) Recommendations: Although some aspects of these recommendations may be applicable to organizations with data processing capabilities, they are primarily of value to units operating an entirely manual personnel system.

(a) The Personnel Management Specialists should be relieved of all extra duties prior to D-Day for the first unit in order to complete

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their normal workload and to permit instructional time.

(b) A test run of rosters and the data base for headquarters element would aid in identifying problems which may not have been anticipated. This test should include simulated identification of the Roll-Up Force and the Color Guard Detachment.

(c) The standdown schedule for all units should be de-classified not later than D-Day of the first element in order that all rosters prepared IAW USARV Pamphlet 600-1 may be submitted early in the standdown. When this is not feasible, units should submit rosters using X-Day terminology in lieu of availability dates.

(d) An in-country assignment roster and DEROS roster card deck should be prepared and segregated by company prior to D-Day. The unit rosters and the card deck should be verified simultaneously with the personnel records. All data necessary for publication of orders should be transferred to the card deck. This will preclude the necessity of having personnel records at the time the orders are published. After verification of the unit rosters and the card deck, the card deck should be divided into two decks, one for in-country reassignments and one for DEROS. This procedure simplifies the preparation of out-processing rosters and precludes duplication of orders. As orders are published and the cards are annotated with the paragraph and SO number, the cards should be refiled alphabetically by battalion. This facilitates identifying orders on individuals at a later date. Prior to publication of orders, the PDY status of all individuals should be re-verified, since changes may have occurred since the initial rosters were submitted.

(e) Personnel were projected for out-processing based on availability dates submitted by their units. The percentage of no-shows resulting from this method was unacceptable because units continually changed the availability dates; therefore, the availability dates should be verified prior to publication of orders to allow an accurate projection for out-processing. Various factors were involved in these changes such as delays in equipment turn-in, personnel not present for duty being scheduled early in the standdown, and the failure of units/individuals to receive orders and out-processing schedules.

(f) Units not under the PERMACAP system should establish coordination with a unit capable of preparing pre-cut stencils for TC's 200, 202, and 206 to facilitate the preparation of orders.

b. Personnel Actions:

(1) Action: Upon notification of standdown, the Personnel Actions

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Branch prepared checklists IAW USARV Pamphlet 600-1 and distributed them to each battalion and separate company, one copy for each individual. These checklists were to be completed and returned not later than seventy-two hours after receipt.

(2) Observations: Distribution of the checklists was accomplished with little difficulty; however, frequent status checks were made by individuals after the checklists had been returned to the Personnel Actions Branch.

(a) Although individuals who were on an extension or had an approved extension indicated this on the checklist, they failed to include the election of options which was required by USARV Pamphlet 600-1. In other cases the individual had to be called in to PSD to recomplete election of options.

(3) Recommendations: The Personnel Action Checklist should be prepared in duplicate so that one copy may be returned to the individual and the other placed in his MPRJ. A separate task force should be designated to monitor and control the checklists and to insure that they get filed in the MPRJ's.

c. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Action: Upon notification of standdown an LOI was published to inform units of the methods to submit recommendations for awards.

(a) A suspense date of X minus forty days was established as a cut-off for awards recommendations.

(b) Personnel who had a minimum of nine months in RVN were considered for a meritorious service award, and those with between three and nine months in RVN were considered for achievement awards.

(2) Observations: The established suspense date facilitated the publication of awards orders in sufficient time for presentation ceremonies and posting of awards in individuals MPRJ prior to the individual departing. Personnel records jackets were filed by out-processing date and this made it very difficult to locate records to screen for previous awards. Several orders were published for personnel whose records were not screened. Consequently, awards that should have been clusters were announced as basic awards and amendments were necessary. Approximately 3000 individual awards were processed during the standdown period.

(3) Recommendations: That units be required to include on awards recommendations whether individuals are being recommended for basic or

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subsequent award. Company clerks should screen individual 201 files to obtain this information before records are broken down for out-processing.

d. Tabs A and B consider the operation of the Quang Tri and Da Nang out-processing centers in detail.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE: During standdown ASD had the sizeable tasks of publishing all the movement orders for individuals in the Brigade and retiring all of the Brigade's records while continuing to provide message center and publications support.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) Orders: The publication of orders and normal publications services were the most time consuming tasks that confronted ASD. The following data reflects the workload:

| <u>Type of Publication</u> | <u>Number Published</u> |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Movement Orders | 5,116 |
| In-country Transfers | 2,876 |
| CONUS Reassignments | 992 |
| Discharge/Separation | 373 |
| Amendments, etc. | 975 |
| Daily Bulletins | 3,771 Impressions |
| General Orders | 7,391 Impressions |

(2) Records Management: Significant clerical man-hours were required to assemble, box, and list the classified and unclassified Brigade records to be retired to the USARYIS Records Center. With the aid of the USARV Records Management the Brigade procedures were tested on the 43rd IPSD. From this experience a simplified records retirement SOP was published (Appendix 3). The SOP was supplemented by frequent visits from the records management officer to insure that the required files were being retired.

(3) Publications Management: Because of the shortage of blank forms and publications in MR I, ASD coordinated with the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and the 23rd Inf Div to ship any publications needed by these units. Ultimately, one CONEX load of materials was shipped to each unit. Normal disposition would have been to burn the materials.

b. Problems: The significant problem that hindered the ASD operation was constant shortage of office supplies necessary to operate the publication section and to box the records for shipment. During the early period in the standdown, reproduction supplies were so limited that nothing but DEROS orders were being published. Similar delays were experienced in

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the records area due to the shortage of records shipment boxes.

c. Recommendations: The unique situation of an inactivating unit seems to warrant a reordering of supply priorities to insure that office type supplies are available in a reasonable time frame. The fact that a unit has a limited number of days to complete this mission should suggest immediate responses to supply request germane to moving the unit and its personnel.

4. POSTAL SERVICE: The APO had two primary missions during standdown: to insure the redirectory service was available for units and individuals and to insure that normal postal services were available as long as feasible.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) Redirect: The APO initiated redirect service by submitting scheme changes as soon as standdown dates for individual units were known. Mail for units was re-directed to HQ, USARV (official) and AMDS (personal) once the unit had officially stood down. In addition, all battalion S-1's were informed of cut off dates for their respective units in reference to letter mail, SAM, PAL, and time value publications. To oversee the correct completion of locator and AMDS cards, a postal NCO was located at the out-processing station. The battalion S-1's and mail clerks were briefed on correct procedure for completing locator cards.

(2) Services: A decrease in money order sales of 21.2 % was experienced, from \$322,755.63 in June to \$254,339.34 in July. Stamp sales increased by 54.3 % in July, from \$6,313.00 in June to \$9,745.00 in July. To accommodate this foreseeable rise in stamp sales, the APO requested an increase in fixed credit from \$7,500.00 to \$10,000.00. The request was approved by HQ, USARPAC on 28 June 1971.

b. Problems:

(1) Scheme changes were submitted for units as soon as standdown dates were known, but difficulties arose when initial notification dates were changed. This change in scheduling required submission of additional scheme changes, superseding the old ones. Many units were misinformed on scheme change procedures necessitating a re-orientation of all battalions.

(2) Major problems were also encountered in submitting and receiving stamp requisitions on a timely basis. The difficulty being that stamp stock could not be received from the Postmaster (San Francisco) rapidly enough to satisfy customers needs.

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c. Recommendations: A primary recommendation would be to allow maximum time in submitting supply and stamp requisitions. To accomplish this, supply requisitions should be submitted as far in advance of C-Day as possible, allowing for maximum quantities of supplies necessary to accommodate the unit being deactivated. Stamp requisitions should be submitted in smaller quantity and dollar amounts to insure more frequent replenishment of stamp stocks. A request for increase in fixed credit would also aid the problem of increased stamp sales. An additional recommendation is that postal scheme changes be hand carried to HQ, USARV to insure that the scheme changes prepared are the changes actually submitted. Some unit mail services were terminated too early because of poor communication. The courier should be an NCO knowledgeable in the postal field.

5. SPECIAL SERVICES: Special Services had two primary goals during the standdown period, to provide recreational activities to soldiers as they returned from the field and to relocate the large amount of special services property.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) R&R Program: Efforts were made to insure that all individuals desiring an R&R during July and August received one. A certificate system was established to serve those people unable to participate in the R&R program because of unit standdown. In the event redeployment of a unit conflicted with an individual's R&R when he reached his new assignment a certificate issued to him would assist him in acquiring an R&R. These certificates benefited the individual by enabling him to take his R&R if he reached his new unit prior to his R&R date and by informing the gaining unit that the individual was unable to use his R&R allocation and encouraging it to expedite his receipt of a new allocation.

(2) Motion Picture Service: The 16mm film program was a major concern in maintaining morale of personnel during off-duty hours. Great interest was shown by the Brigade units in the film program. As the standdown progressed, a need was found for movies at the replacement out-processing areas. Since there were no projectors available, and USARV would not fill a requirement on short notice, it became necessary to borrow other unit's projectors to show the film.

b. Problems: The need for showing movies until near the end of standdown and the poor condition of the property book prior to standdown created problems for Special Services.

(1) Commanders were quite anxious to have movies available throughout standdown for entertainment and to aid in controlling the troops

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Problems arose as units turned in their equipment and fewer projectors were available. Special Services attempted to arrange an interim projector loan program through HQ, USARV to fill this gap. Because of the time span involved, the application was rejected.

(2) Immediately prior to standdown a new Special Services officer was assigned. Earlier laxity had created property accountability problems that required solving before the property could be released to other units. Considerable investigating was required to construct the property book.

(3) Much of the Special Services standdown planning was based on the concept that there would be an increased requirement for recreational facilities as troops came in from the field; however, daily attendance taken at each facility proved this erroneous. The daily attendance dropped enormously as the larger units prepared their equipment for redeployment. The only large crowds occurred when there were USO shows or other mass scheduled activities.

c. Recommendations:

(1) Efforts should be made to establish a HQ, USARV rotating pool of projectors for use by standdown units. The ready availability of movies during such a high pressure period is a tremendous morale factor. Since the units are continuously losing troops during the standdown, one projector for each battalion would be adequate to cover this need.

(2) Units should insure that their Special Services property books have been managed well or at a minimum reorganized prior to standdown. Numerous delays may be avoided through careful management.

6. CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS:

18 Jun - Requested increase in postal fixed credit from \$7,500.00 to \$10,000.00 to HQ, USARV.

19 Jun - Briefed Bn S-1's on mail redirection concepts.

22 Jun - Submitted first scheme change to HQ, USARV.

23 Jun - Submitted letter to Postmaster, San Francisco, requesting discontinuance of publications.

26 Jun - July R&R allocations sent out.

5 Jul - Quang Tri out-processing center opened.

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- 07 Jul - Second increment scheme change submitted.
- 10 Jul - Third increment scheme change submitted.
- 14 Jul - Received approval for increased fixed credit.
- 18 Jul - Fourth increment scheme change submitted.
- 19 Jul - LO 611, Unit Movement Order for the 1-77 Armor published.
- 21 Jul - Fifth increment scheme change submitted.
- 23 Jul - Swimming pool closed, sent to 101st Airborne Division (Ambl)
- 25 Jul - Camp Roberts Craftshop closed; sent to 45th Eng Gp, Camp Haskins.
- 26 Jul - Service Club closed; sent to 45th Eng Gp, Camp Haskins.
- 27 Jul - LO 625, Unit Movement Order for 1-61 published.
- 31 Jul - LO 630, Unit Movement Order for 1-11 published.
 - Craft shop closed sent to XXIV Corps.
 - Library closed sent to 45th Eng Gp Camp Haskins.
- 02 Aug - Satellite units start drawing films from 101st Airborne Division (
 - LO 632, Unit Movement Order for A/75th published.
 - LO 633, Unit Movement Order for 5-4 Arty published.
 - LO 634, Unit Movement Order for HHC, 1-5 (M) published.
- 04 Aug - 112 films returned to Da Nang VRO, 4 new films drawn, 7 retained.
- 06 Aug - Sixth increment scheme change submitted.
- 08 Aug - APO financial operations closed.
- 09 Aug - Quang Tri processing center closed.
 - Da Nang processing center opened at Freedom Hill R&R Center.
- 10 Aug - All accountable equipment sent to Postmaster, San Francisco.

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12 Aug - All films returned to VRO Da Nang.

14 Aug - APO 96477 closed.

19 Aug - 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) closed last morning report.

LIST OF TABS

- A. Quang Tri Personnel Center
- B. Da Nang Personnel Processing Center

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TAB A (Quang Tri Personnel Center) to APPENDIX 1 (Adjutant General) to
ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry
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1. GENERAL:

a. Procedures and facilities for out-processing normal DEROS losses already existed and additional facilities were established to process the higher redeployment load.

b. Ten days prior to a unit's standdown, each unit received an AG checklist, which indicated those tasks requiring consideration prior to arrival for standdown.

c. On the first day of unit's standdown, an AG contact team delivered the initial shipping rosters and briefed the unit regarding required procedures to ship personnel to new units or for DEROS out-processing. At this time any specific questions were answered.

2. OUT-PROCESSING SCHEDULES:

a. Prior to any scheduling, availability dates on all personnel were established, a standdown schedule was published and certain days designated as shipping dates. Availability dates were entered on specially developed redeployment Personnel Rosters.

b. Once availability dates were established by individual units and assignments obtained from USAHV, shipping rosters were produced.

(1) Shipping Rosters indicated gaining unit, out-processing time, name, rank, and losing unit.

(2) The maximum capacity of the out-processing center was established to be 200 people per day. Personnel were scheduled to out-process at 0730, 0830, 0930 and 1030. A minimum of 50 people per hour were scheduled and, whenever possible, the number processed per hour was increased rather than lengthening the processing day.

(3) Shipping Rosters were delivered to a unit on its first day of standdown. Distribution was as follows:

(a) Unit concerned.

(b) Personnel Records Branch, Personnel Actions Branch and Personnel Management.

(c) Brigade Finance.

(d) Brigade S-4.

c. Once availability dates were established by commanders, these

TAB A (Quang Tri Personnel Center) to APPENDIX 1 (Adjutant General) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

could be changed and the rate of processing accelerated if desired. The only restriction placed on commanders was that the requests precede the changed availability date by four days so transportation could be rescheduled.

3. OUT-PROCESSING FACILITIES:

a. The Records section out-processing center was staffed with one Warrant Officer and 10 enlisted personnel. Duty positions for these men were as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (1) Officer in charge. | 1 |
| (2) NCOIC. | 1 |
| (3) Records clerks. | 8 |
| (4) ID cards/tags. | 1 |

b. An out-processing line comprised of seven different stations and an out-processing checklist were used to insure a complete check of an individual's records.

4. STATUS REPORT: Two reports were used to monitor the status of Personnel out-processing.

a. Daily Personnel Processing Report indicated daily losses and cumulative totals for both DEROS losses and in-country transfers, and was the primary source of information for briefing purposes.

b. Unit Standdown Report was prepared indicating daily losses by units that were in standdown phase; i.e. starting with unit standdown strength as of the standdown date, it presented the total number of personnel processed per day.

5. LESSONS LEARNED: Personnel Availability.

a. Observation: Personnel not arriving for out-processing on the scheduled availability date caused minor difficulty at the processing center and resulted in overscheduled personnel on a given date.

b. Evaluation: Units were required to call the PSD out-processing center at least 24 hours in advance of scheduled shipping date if there were significant changes.

c. Recommendations: That command emphasis be placed on personnel movement requirements during standdown.

TAB B (Da Nang Personnel Processing Center) to APPEXDIX 1 (Adjutant General) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: On 9 August 1971 the personnel out-processing center was relocated at the Freedom Hill R&R Center in Da Nang. An advance party had been sent to evaluate the location and determine the plan for the flow of personnel through the processing building. The new center was operational by 1600 hours, 9 August 1971. See Inclosure 1.

2. METHOD OF OPERATION:

a. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) AG Rear at Quang Tri provided a by-name listing on a daily basis of the personnel who were scheduled to out-process.

b. Group processing times were established at 0900, 1300 and 1800 hours daily. Processing was accomplished with a briefing area and five stations.

c. Personnel with specific problems were referred to the appropriate section of the Personnel Services Division which was co-located with the out-processing center.

3. OBSERVATIONS:

a. Personnel scheduled for out-processing arrived at the center sporadically, and in many cases late, causing disruption in the processing schedule and transportation coordination.


b. Telephone communications were insufficient and decreased the effectiveness of coordination efforts with Quang Tri and the Keystone turn-in point at Da Nang.

c. The actual processing of personnel was accomplished with no difficulties encountered.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Personnel departing various locations enroute to the processing center should be escorted by a responsible individual who will be capable of ensuring that all personnel will arrive at their destination at the prescribed time.

b. Adequate telephone communications should be established prior to the date operations must begin.



INCLOSURE 1 to TAB B

APPENDIX 2 (Civilian Personnel) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: Prior to standdown, the Brigade had on record approximately 400 domestic and direct daily hire local national employees. Brigade units had established Domestic Hire Funds. Daily hires were controlled by the Civilian Personnel Office, which administered the Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) fund.
2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPT: It was determined that as each unit stood down it would progressively terminate the employment of its civilian personnel. At the same time, coordination was effected to transfer the Civilian Personnel Office to 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry which assumed the role of host unit at Quang Tri Combat Base.
3. DISCUSSION: Each unit submitted SF Forms 52, "Request for Personnel Action", to the CPO as soon as effective release dates for civilian employees could be established. Each employee to be released was given two weeks notice and severance pay upon termination of employment. In addition, letters of appreciation were presented to outstanding employees. Where possible, assistance was rendered in helping terminated employees secure employment with new units moving onto Quang Tri Combat Base.
4. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The concept of operation and implementation resulted in a smooth and orderly reduction in force. No significant problems were encountered.

APPENDIX 3 (Funds and Messes) to Annex B (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
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1. GENERAL: Upon receipt of notification for redeployment, the Brigade was faced with the dissolution of six consolidated unit funds, five domestic hire funds, and several other miscellaneous funds.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

a. Funds would remain active as long as possible in order to provide services to units with a majority of personnel remaining.

b. A Brigade Auditing Officer was appointed on orders to perform audits at Brigade level.

3. DISCUSSION: Each unit was scheduled for closing their funds. Based upon size of the fund, staggered suspense dates were assigned for dissolution of funds, turn-in of property, unit audits, and finally the Brigade audit. The situation was simplified due to the USARV Annual General Inspection which took place shortly before the Brigade was notified of redeployment. The net effect of the AGI and unit audits was to correct minor administrative errors, thereby significantly reducing the time required for Brigade Audits.

4. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. As a result of the AGI, the planned pre-audits were no longer necessary, and no significant problems were experienced in the auditing and retirement of the unit funds and domestic hire funds.

b. A delay of two weeks was experienced in closing the Commanding General's Mess Other Sundry Fund. The mess remained operational until 5 days before the final day of standdown. Bulk inventory and transfer of property and consumable goods require in the sale of remaining bar stock had to be sent to the United States and processed through computers there. The custodian had to wait until the branch bank in Vietnam had received notification to credit the account before writing the check for the final amount closing out the fund. It is recommended that commands processing Other Sundry Funds of a similar structure, plan to close out the Other Sundry Fund at least three weeks prior to the last day of unit standdown. This will allow time to timely completion of all necessary processing and paperwork while the units communications with higher headquarters is operating at capacity.

c. The Civilian Personnel Office's two Assistance in Kind Funds were audited at Brigade. The Civilian Personnel Officer carried the residual money for turn-in to Da Nang and returned the receipts. The AIK accounts could not be closed out at the MACV Comptroller's Office without the vouchers for the two funds. The auditing officer, who was assistant Brigade S 1, had DEROSSED and there was no paperwork that indicated the disposition of the vouchers following the final audit. It is recommended, in the future, that all paperwork be retained and handcarried by the responsible officer to the proper agencies for dissolution. The officer would then return the receipts to the unit and obtain final clearance of his fund.

APPENDIX 4 (Finance) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st
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1. GENERAL: To provide a review and evaluation of finance services provided during redeployment/inactivation of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) the following objectives were established:

a. To maintain normal finance services for the Brigade during the redeployment/inactivation period.

b. To provide regular and out-processing services to departing personnel.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

a. Pay accounts of personnel assigned to the Brigade were maintained in accordance with JUMPS-Army procedures Phase I. Phase II of the system was to be implemented on 1 July 1971, however, instructions received from the Finance Center, US Army, indicated that all personnel serviced by this office would be transferred off the JUMPS-Army system effective 1 August 1971.

b. Personnel assigned to units that were scheduled for standdown out-processing between the 1st and 20th of the month were not paid the mid-month pay. Personnel assigned to units that were scheduled for standdown out-processing between the 21st and the end of the month received their mid-month pay.

c. Personnel who were returning to CONUS for separation and those reassigned in-country were not paid during out-processing with the exception of those on the accrual system. These individuals could have requested a partial payment not to exceed the amount accrued as indicated on the last monthly voucher, less all outstanding collections. Personnel returning to CONUS or another overseas theater for reassignment were afforded an advance pay of up to three months base pay for married personnel and up to one month's base pay for single personnel, depending on the time of month they were out-processed (between the 1st and 15th of the month the amount of one half of one month's pay, between the 16th and 30th of the month the amount was one month's base pay).

d. Out-processing was accomplished at Company A (Replacement), 75th Support Battalion, and the Brigade Finance area. Records to be out-processed on a certain day were closed out the night before in the Brigade Finance area at Camp Red Devil.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. General:

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(1) Upon receipt of notification of pending Brigade redeployment/inactivation, detailed plans and necessary changes in operating procedures were made.

(2) Instructions were given to all units and staff agencies regarding Finance procedures during redeployment/inactivation.

(3) Coordination was made with the Office of the Adjutant General to obtain special orders on individuals five days prior to scheduled out-processing.

b. Finance Operations:

(1) Redeployment Pay Requests were distributed to all redeploying/inactivating units to be completed by personnel and returned to the Finance Office by five days prior to scheduled out-processing.

(2) A forward service team of one NCO and six clerks manned the out-processing section at Company A (Replacement) and regular finance personnel out-processed individuals in the Brigade Finance area.

(3) There were no interruptions of finance services to units at Camp Red Devil prior and during redeployment of personnel.

4. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Units not returning Redeployment Pay Requests on time.

(1) Problem: The Redeployment Pay Requests were not returned to the Finance Office five days prior to scheduled out-processing date. This necessitated closing out the pay records in the Replacement area rather than in the Finance area the night before as planned.

(2) Lessons Learned: Finance out-processing was not as time consuming as personnel records out-processing. In most cases individuals did not spend over five minutes in the Financial phase of out-processing. Brigade Finance then started out-processing at two locations - Replacement and Brigade Finance area. This reduced sharply the number of personnel who had to wait for their finance records to be brought to Replacement for out-processing. Approximately 75 % of all financial records were given out at the Brigade Finance area and when personnel reported to Replacement there was no delay in out-processing.

(3) Recommendation: That the majority of finance records be closed out and given to personnel in the main finance area. The availability of necessary forms, funds, and additional personnel resources made this advisable.

APPENDIX 4 (Finance) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st
Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE
(BRAVO)

c. Late arrival of July End of Month vouchers.

(1) Problem: The July End of Month vouchers were lost or mailed to an incorrect address and not received in time to be included in the FDRF of departing personnel.

(2) Lessons Learned: A message was sent to the Finance Center, US Army, requesting disposition of EOM vouchers for July. The Finance Center advised that the vouchers were being rerun and were mailed 5 August 1971. The EOM vouchers were distributed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, USARV, to the gaining units using the DA Form 141's maintained and forwarded by the Brigade Finance Officer.

(3) Recommendation: Close coordination must be made with the Finance Center and Postal authority to insure receipt of the pay vouchers for the last regular pay period.

5. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

- 1 Jul 71 Received Operations Order directing redeployment/inactivation.
- 5 Jul 71 Began preparing records for out-processing.
- 6 Jul 71 Out-processing team moved to Company A (Replacement).
- 8 Aug 71 Out-processing team moved back to Brigade Finance area.
- 9 Aug 71 Equipment turned in.
- 10 Aug 71 Finance Operations stopped at close of business day.
- 13 Aug 71 Deactivation of Disbursing activities.
- 15 Aug 71 Deactivation of Finance Office, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

APPENDIX 5 (Public Information) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: The purpose of this annex is to discuss the handling of information matters associated with the redeployment of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). This report is intended as guidance for information officers involved in redeployment operations.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

a. Since the standdown announcement had been anticipated much of the ground work had been prepared for the standdown requirements.

b. Using the Brigade's redeployment plan as a guide, a task list was prepared utilizing personnel resources available to the Information Office. Tasks were assigned so that routine missions could be accomplished by the various sections in addition to the redeployment projects.

c. During the period of redeployment, the Information Office was faced with a two-fold responsibility: the routine assistance to correspondents and the preparation of the materials associated with redeployment.

d. The goal of the Information Office was to provide the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Office of Information (MACOI) with materials on redeploying units well in advance of the announcement dates, Memorandums on all units were hand carried to MACOI where they were approved and stored in their classified container. Three days prior to the release date a member of our office went to MACOI, prepared a memorandum stencil on the units being announced and disseminated them on the date of the announcement.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Command Information Activities:

(1) Because of the long lead time of our bi-monthly brigade newspaper it was decided to make the last edition of the paper the one in production when word was received of the standdown. Production was immediately begun on a twelve page souvenir edition of the newspaper, highlighting the Brigade's three year history in Vietnam. This paper along with the latest brigade magazine was distributed to troops at the out-processing center.

(2) A fact sheet was prepared explaining redeployment criteria. It was distributed to each man in the Brigade. The flyer, based on material provided by USARV-IO and updated by our Adjutant General, explained how the individual soldier was to be affected by the standdown.

APPENDIX 5 (Public Information) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

(3) As the strength of the Brigade was reduced, a corresponding reduction in the issue of free Stars and Stripes was affected. This was done by notifying USARV-IO telephonically of significant reductions as they occurred.

b. Public Information Activities:

(1) News releases were prepared for each unit standing down. Fifty copies of the release and information concerning the unit which could be used by MACV in its daily news briefing, were made available to MACOI at least two days prior to the release date. (See TAB A: Format for Correspondents Memorandum).

(2) A representative of the Brigade Information Office, in Saigon, coordinated the release of material between MACOI and the Information Office.

(3) A final news kit on the Brigade was being developed for representatives of the news media. Because of short deadline and lack of funds, it was impossible to have press kit covers produced commercially. Instead, they were homemade using a photograph of lettering and the Brigade patch as a cover. In anticipation of a possible redeployment, the Information Office has already researched the unit histories. Updating of this information, recopying the releases and selection of representative photos of the Brigade were the greatest tasks associated with this project. Fifty press kits were prepared. (See TAB B: Contents of Press Kits).

4. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Promised photo support did not materialize.

(1) Problem: The 298th Signal Company dismantled its photo lab.

(2) Lessons Learned: SEAPIC at Phu Bai was tasked to develop photos for the Information Office, but due to power problems was unable to provide the required support. Material had to be shipped to SEAPIC at Long Binh.

(3) Recommendations: In order to have adequate photo support, arrangements should be made for the signal photo lab equipment to remain functional as long as the information office is operational.

b. Reference Material on Brigade units.

(1) Problem: A vast amount of information was required for each

APPENDIX 5 (Public Information) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

unit's press release. Items such as unit histories, lists of unit and individual awards and photos are time consuming, and require many hours of research.

(2) Lessons Learned: This material can be gathered beforehand.

(3) Recommendations: That the Information Office keep an up-to-date file at all times of unit histories, pictures and awards presented to the unit.

5. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

13 Jun 71 - Draft of information annex to OPLAN submitted.

20 Jun 71 - Re-written draft plan completed and finalized.

20 Jun 71 - Souvenir Issue of Brigade newspaper completed.

21 Jun 71 - Draft plan submitted and accepted by S-3.

23 Jun 71 - OPLAN 183-70 was implemented as an operations order.

26 Jun 71 - Brigade Press Kit completed.

27 Jun 71 - IO liaison officer was sent to MACOI to coordinate clearance of news release.

01 Jul 71 - First unit redeployment announcement.

10 Jul 71 - Souvenir Issue of Brigade newspaper distributed.

10 Aug 71 - 48th Public Information Detachment members became available for redeployment.

TAB A - Format for Correspondents' Memorandum.

TAB B - Contents of Press Kit.

TAB A (Format for Correspondents' Memorandum) to APPENDIX 5 (Public Information)
to ANNEX B (Personnel & Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

SUBJECT: Eighth Increment Troop Redeployment

UNIT: _____

SERVICE: US Army

PARENT COMMAND: _____

COMMANDING OFFICER: _____

SENIOR NCO: _____

AWARDS FOR SERVICE IN RVN: _____

DISPOSITION OF UNIT: Redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF SPACE REDUCTIONS: _____

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TAB B (Contents of Press Kits) to APPENDIX 5 (Public Information) to ANNEX B
(Personnel & Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

The Press Kits consisted of the following items:

1. Picture biography of the CG.
2. A copy of the latest Northernmost.
3. A list of the Brigade command group down to Battalion Commanders and Sergeant Majors.
4. A history of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from its founding.
5. A chronology of significant events in the Brigade's history in Vietnam.
6. A brief history of the patch and motto.
7. Six action photos of the Brigade.
8. A copy of the latest Red Devil Brigade.

APPENDIX 6 (Provost Marshal) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: The Brigade Provost Marshal's Office had the primary objective of ensuring normal military police support during redeployment activities.

2. REDEPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES:

a. Effect an orderly transition and transfer of military police functions to the gaining area support unit.

b. Continuation of command programs such as Drug and Narcotic Suppression and traffic control.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Traffic Control: A traffic circulation plan was published and strict enforcement was employed to better control traffic on Quang Tri Combat Base. A separate tracked vehicle plan was established to limit the routes travelled by these vehicles. Additional measures were introduced to increase control over personnel and equipment, and to reduce the number of unauthorized weapons, vehicle usage, and personnel absences.

b. Drug and Narcotic Suppression: A comprehensive three phase Drug and Narcotic Suppression Program was initiated just prior to notification of redeployment, and was aggressively pursued during standdown. The problem was approached on three avenues: education, enforcement and suppression.

(1) Education: Seminars were held with elements of the command. Panel members were from the Surgeon's Office, Staff Judge Advocate and the Brigade Provost Marshal. During these seminars, the Brigade program was explained and the units encouraged to seek help from the Military Police in conducting shake down inspections etc. Additionally, the highlights of the enforcement efforts were expounded on by the Provost Marshal.

(2) Enforcement: Outstanding support was established between the Provost Marshal and the local Vietnamese law enforcement officials. A program of Drug and Narcotic Suppression raids by coordinated elements of the ARVN Quan Cau, Vietnamese Military Police, Vietnamese Military Security Service personnel and American Military Police was initiated. The impact of the results of this operation was highlighted by the fact that for the month of June, the Quang Tri area confiscated more narcotics, drugs and marijuana than any other Province in Vietnam. This fact is even more prodigious when you consider that the operation was Northernmost.

APPENDIX 6 (Provost Marshal) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
ORIOLE (BRAVO)

(3) Suppression: Working to complement the other two phases of the program, the suppression activities allowed the Provost Marshal to apply pressure directly to the troops in their unit areas. Teams of MP's and trained dogs were dispatched on a regular basis to search and shake down unit areas. This had great impact on the troops and alleviated the pressure that might have been felt by the unit commander if he had conducted the operation on the troops himself. This phase accounted for numerous confiscations of drugs, narcotics, marijuana, illegal weapons and ammunition, as well as developing a feeling of employed enforcement in the minds of the troops.

(4) Through a combination of all three phases of suppression, enforcement activities and education, a very effective program was developed. Unit commanders were given the maximum in support and control of personnel of the Brigade was greatly increased.

c. Phase-out of Brigade Provost Marshal activities was conducted as a five point program:

(1) Effective 1 July 1971, all CID Report of Investigation (ROI) case numbers were obtained from 8th CI Group, allowing sufficient time to close out all active investigations under Brigade ROI numbers. This action insured that all new cases could be worked to completion under normal suspenses by the gaining CID unit and guaranteed effective area CID support through and after completion of the Brigade standdown by providing an extensive transition period for the 8th CI Group in assuming a larger AO.

(2) During the period 1-15 July 1971, C/504 MP Battalion personnel were phased into the Brigade Provost Marshal's operation, including motorized patrols and static check points. This period allowed for familiarization of mission needs, and time to assess the situation and available resources for assuming the Brigade's MP mission.

(3) The period 16-31 July 1971 saw C/504 MP Battalion personnel assume steadily increasing mission requirements. Desk Sergeant personnel augmented the Brigade desk and were cross-trained in the current desk operations.

(4) On 1 August, C/504 MP Battalion assumed the dual mission of area Military Police support and area Provost Marshal.

(5) During the period 1-8 August, the Brigade Provost Marshal and staff served in an advisory capacity to the personnel of C/504 MP Battalion.

APPENDIX 6 (Provost Marshal) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
ORIOLE (BRAVO)

4. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: No significant problems were encountered.

APPENDIX 7 (Chaplain) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. PURPOSE: To review and evaluate the activities of the Brigade Chaplain's Office of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) during the redeployment/inactivation actions.

2. GENERAL: The Brigade Chaplain Section was one Chaplain overstrength at the time standdown began. Each Chaplain was made aware of the stand-down on a need-to-know basis. The Chaplains were briefed on area coverage, TOE equipment, and Chaplain's Fund property.

3. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

- a. Religious Coverage during standdown.
- b. Personnel Changes.
- c. Fund Administration.
- d. Property Management.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. Our mission was to provide full religious coverage throughout standdown. Regularly scheduled services were held in each chapel as long as a need existed. Area coverage was stressed. All Chaplains in the Quang Tri area, including a local contract clergyman, were utilized in giving complete coverage.

b. Personnel Changes:

(1) Four of our six Chaplains' normal DEROS's were during stand-down. Their departures were spaced and coincided with the standdown schedule.

(2) The two remaining Chaplains were reassigned in-country.

(3) The chaplain assistants were reassigned through coordination with USARV Chaplains Office and XXIV Corps Chaplains Office.

c. Fund Administration: All outstanding indebtedness was liquidated; no new orders were placed, recurring orders were cancelled and the account was closed with the bank. Fund property was transferred to the XXIV Corps Chaplains Fund. A final audit was performed. A check representing the final balance was sent through channels to the Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Army Chaplains Fund. The Fund records were retired in accordance with current policies and Army Regulations.

APPENDIX 7 (Chaplain) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
ORIOLE (BRAVO)

d. Property Management:

(1) The Brigade Chaplain's Office inventoried all Chaplain Fund properties. The property was transferred to XXIV Corps Chaplains Fund. All TOE property and FSN Ecclesiastical equipment was turned-in through supply channels.

(2) Non-governmental pews and chairs that were not on any property records were donated to the local Catholic and Protestant Churches in Quang Tri City, in coordination with the Brigade S-5.

(3) Five Chapel facilities were transferred to ARVN in accordance with existing policies and appropriate regulations. One chapel facility was retained as United States property.

5. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Problem: The normal DEROS of one Catholic Chaplain and the reassignment of another by the USARV Chaplains Office, left Quang Tri area without adequate Catholic coverage. This necessitated utilizing a local Catholic priest to provide minimal coverage which was essentially limited to Sunday services.

b. Lessons Learned: Chaplain reassignments must be made with greater care. Consideration should be given to local requirements of units that are standing down.

c. Recommendations: That close coordination be maintained between Chaplain channels throughout the Command chain regarding Chaplain reassignments.

6. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

a. 28 Jun - Final Fund Council meeting to close-out Consolidated Chaplains Fund.

b. 30 Jun - Consolidated Chaplains Fund ceased operation.

c. 01 Jul - Turn-in of TOE equipment began.

d. 12 Jul - Fund property transferred to XXIV Corps Chaplains Fund.

e. 14 Jul - Audit of Consolidated Chaplains Fund began.

f. 19 Jul - Audit of Fund completed.

APPENDIX 7 (Chaplain) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE
ORIOLE (BRAVO)

g. 20 Jul - Consolidated Chaplains Fund terminated. Check represent-
ing final balance sent to Chief of Chaplains. Close-out documents sent
to USARV Chaplains Office.

h. 30 Jul - Turn-in of TOE property completed.

i. 09 Aug - Number of Chapel services reduced.

j. 15 Aug - Chaplain Section closed out.

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APPENDIX 8 (Staff Judge Advocate) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report
KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: Redeployment Objectives:

- a. Provide continuing legal services to all units and individuals at Camp Red Devil.
- b. Complete all disciplinary matters prior to redeployment of each unit.
- c. Close out existing claims files and transfer those claims that could not be adjudicated.
- d. Provide for transfer of cases where trial could not be completed prior to inactivation.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS: As the schedule of inactivation was announced, pending cases were assigned priority according to the inactivation status of the unit involved. Emphasis was placed on the use of non-judicial punishment and administrative alternatives to court-martial to reduce the normal caseloads. In those cases where action could not be completed prior to inactivation, the accused were transferred under flagging action and the charges were forwarded to the receiving command for trial. Personal property claims were processed as expeditiously as possible with a termination date for claims acceptance so that unadjudicated claims would be reduced to a minimum.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. The manning level of the office of the Brigade Judge Advocate was maintained well into standdown until the workload sufficiently decreased to insure that legal services were available to the remaining elements of the Brigade.

b. All inferior court cases pending in the Brigade were tried or transferred prior to inactivation.

c. The claims operation was given additional emphasis during the inactivation period. Processing time on personnel claims was reduced to 24 hours in most cases and assistance was obtained from MACV Team 19 in the investigation of foreign claims. The establishment of a cut-off date for acceptance of claims allowed pending claims to be reduced to a minimum. The unadjudicated claims were transferred with notification of transfer made to all claimants.

4. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Transfer of drug cases where lab analysis is incomplete.

APPENDIX 8 (Staff Judge Advocate) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report
KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

a. Problem: Some accused pending drug charges were transferred to CONUS instead of being reassigned in-country for trial.

b. Lessons Learned: In some drug cases where charges had not been referred due to lengthy delay in lab analysis, the accused were allowed to clear and depart for CONUS under the DEROS drops received due to in-activation. Faulty unit clearance procedures and failure to properly use flagging action contributed to the confusion caused by the early DEROS of the individuals. Consequently, the charges had to be forwarded to the receiving commander in CONUS where trial would be more difficult.

c. Recommendations: That when the units initially request orders on their personnel, especially in drug cases, they furnish information to USARV, AG that charges are pending to insure retention in RVN for trial.

5. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

- 14 Jun - Notification of inactivation received by SJA.
- 01 Jul - SPCM Jurisdiction over 3/5 Cav cases transferred to 101st Abn Div (Ambl).
- 04 Jul - All previously referred 3/5 Cav cases tried and all non-referred 3/5 Cav cases transferred to 101st Abn Div (Ambl).
- 18 Jul - Final SPCM case tried at Camp Red Devil.
- 25 Jul - Closed-out personnel property claims acceptance.
- 01 Aug - Turn-in of non-essential equipment.
- 05 Aug - All personal property claims paid or transferred.
- 10 Aug - Terminated foreign claims acceptance and completed transmittal of pending claims.
- 13 Aug - Departed Camp Red Devil for Da Nang Processing Center, Liaison to XXIV Corps.
- 15 Aug - Transfer of all pending cases completed.
- 16 Aug - Final report submitted.
- 17 Aug - Close-out of SJA function.

ANNEX C (Intelligence) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: The Brigade S2 performed the following tasks during stand-down of the Brigade's various units:

a. Continued maintaining intelligence on the current enemy situation during disengagement of the Brigade's units.

b. Provided staff supervision of the standdown activities to insure safeguarding of classified defense information.

c. Provided staff supervision of the disposition/destruction of classified defense information.

d. Provided for the orderly transfer of intelligence assets.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. The Brigade S2, supported by the 517th Military Intelligence Detachment, maintained intelligence collection activities throughout the standdown period commensurate with Brigade requirements and capabilities. Intelligence assets organic to the Brigade were utilized to the maximum extent practicable and included continued coordination with various military and civilian intelligence elements to provide information on developments which might hinder or affect the Brigade. Continued intelligence support was provided to analyze, interpret, and evaluate information received from these agencies. Liaison was conducted daily with ARVN and 101st Airborne Division (Amb) and was of prime importance due to the decreased radio and landline communication capability. Finally, daily briefings were provided the Commander to insure that he was aware of the enemy activities in the area surrounding the Combat Base.

b. Guidelines for the appointment of an officer or warrant officer to act as the UNIT SECURITY CONTROL OFFICER (USCO) were given to each unit down to and including company level. The USCO, appointed on unit orders, was briefed on his responsibilities at the Brigade weekly intelligence update briefing and problem areas were discussed. The USCO was charged with the responsibility for the inspection of buildings, vehicles, etc. to see that no classified material was left in the unit's area, and that all classified material was properly destroyed or transferred to AG Classified. Counterintelligence agents were used to assist with preliminary inspections, debriefing of personnel, and destruction of classified documents. Courtesy counterintelligence inspections were made to locate problem areas and to provide advice to other units on how to avoid the same problems. When a unit was prepared for final clearance, counterintelligence agent personnel made a final check of the aforementioned items. Everyone with access to classified material including CONFIDENTIAL was debriefed, Security Termination Statements were executed, and a final check was made against the Security Control Rosters to insure that complete debriefing was accomplished.

ANNEX C (Intelligence) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

c. During the standdown period, all intelligence files and documents were disposed of IAW appropriate Regulations. Classified files which were not transferred to other allied elements were destroyed and logged. Counter-intelligence personnel reviewed these records to ascertain that destruction was performed properly.

d. There were two major areas of intelligence assets to be transferred:
(1) Sensor equipment and (2) Intelligence files.

(1) Once official notice of the standdown had been received, coordination was affected to provide for the orderly transfer of sensor equipment. Category R Equipment (both expendable sensors on-shelf and in-the-ground) were transferred by means of the Sensor Status Report to ARVN and 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). Category N Equipment (non-expendable sensor related equipment) was transferred to CRB-SMF on a DA Form 2765-1 and issued to the Advisor to 1st ARVN Division on a DA Form 2060. Bass III terminal equipment was transferred in the same manner as category N Equipment with the exception of the FM/FM Relay System which was shipped to CRB-SMF. Communication equipment to include an SB-22 and VRC-46 were transferred to the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) to be operated by a liaison team from that unit. Finally, the ARVN Sensor Section assumed Bass III operations in conjunction with a three (3) man Liaison Team from the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL).

(2) 517th Military Intelligence Detachment files concerning enemy activity and other material of the various sections of the Detachment were transferred or distributed to Allied units in Adjacent Areas of Operation or to those elements assuming responsibility for the Area of Operation formerly held by the Brigade. Interested agencies reviewed the files and those files not transferred were destroyed IAW appropriate Regulations.

3. CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- 1 Jul 71 - Standdown began; counterintelligence personnel available on request to assist all units.
- 2 Jul 71 - USCO received an initial briefing at the weekly S2 briefing.
- 7 Jul 71 - The transfer of the 517th Military Intelligence files was coordinated.

ANNEX C (Intelligence) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

- 19 Jul 71 - Official notification that the Bass III system and related assets were to be transferred.
- 21 Jul 71 - Transfer of category R Sensor Equipment.
- 23 Jul 71 - Transfer of 517th Military Intelligence Detachment files.
- 31 Jul 71 - Transfer of category N and Bass III Terminal Sensor Equipment.
- 1 Aug 71 - Transfer of Bass III operations.
- 4 Aug 71 - Agent Reports, Debriefing Teams, and Liaison Contact Teams completed activities.
- 5 Aug 71 - 517th Military Intelligence Detachment began standdown.
- 8 Aug 71 - 517th Military Intelligence Detachment completed standdown.
- 11 Aug 71 - Completed briefings for the Commander.
- 19 Aug 71 - Counterintelligence activities and inspections completed.

ANNEX D (Operations) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After
Action Report KEYSTONE ORICLE (BRAVO)

1. The 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div (M) was conducting OPERATION MONTANA MUSTANG when notification on 14 June 71 was received to begin standdown as part of Increment VIII and to execute USARV OPLAN 183-70 as OPOD 183-70. The Brigade developed OPLAN 183-70. Repositioning forces and phase-down of combat operations was directed in accordance with FRAGO's to current OPOD.

2. At the time of notification, the Brigade's combat battalions were deployed throughout Quang Tri Province as shown by Figure 1. At Appendix I is the task organization.

a. In AO Orange TF 1-61 provided security for FSBs C-2 and A-4, while continuing to conduct reconnaissance operations along the southern boundary of the DMZ. Elements from each of the other Task Forces were frequently placed under operational control of TF 1-61. In addition, the battalion was tasked with the responsibility of supporting ARVN Forces through blocking positions and supporting fires.

b. TF 1-11 conducted search and clear, reconnaissance, and rocket suppression operations in AO White. The Battalion CP located at FSB Anne was secured by one rifle company. Throughout the operation the battalion retained the Bald Eagle/Sparrow Hawk mission. During part of the period of rice harvest, TF 1-11 was assigned responsibility for AO Blue where, in conjunction with RF/PF units from Mai Linh and Hai Lang Districts, it conducted rice denial operations.

c. TF 1-77 conducted search and clear operations in AO Green employing cavalry, tank and infantry units, and conducted operations in the AO with emphasis placed on combined operations with the Huong Hoa Regional Forces Group.

d. On 24 June TF 3-5 (redesignated TF Osborn) moved to TD085598 where it supported ARVN Forces in operations around FSB Fuller. After this operation, the Squadron moved its CP to IHCB and conducted operations in AO Green

3. The following parameters were established for executing redeployment:

a. Continue tactical operations in TF AOs until the latest possible date consistent with unit standdown dates.

b. Continue combat base security utilizing Brigade assets until the latest possible date consistent with unit standdown suspenses.

4. Redeployment was accomplished within these parameters as outlined below:

a. TF 1-77 Armor moved from its field headquarters at Mai Loc on 25 June 71 relinquishing its command post/fire base to Vietnamese Forces. The battalion then began maintenance operations at Quang Tri Combat Base in preparation for its standdown date of 1 July 71. Concurrently, the battalion continued to secure its assigned bunker line section on Quang Tri Combat Base through 13 July 1971. (Figure 2)

b. TF 1-61 Inf continued its mission through 10 July 71 as the only United States unit deployed along the DMZ. During the period 9-10 July elements of the 1st ARVN Div assumed control of FB C-2 and A-4 and TF 1-61 conducted a phased withdrawal from AO Orange. This provided the ARVN with security while moving their troops into the AO. Upon return of the 1-61 Inf to Quang Tri Combat Base, the battalion assumed control of two sectors of the bunker line and provided personnel to augment other sectors. The 1-61's base defense commitment terminated on 21 July 1971. (Figure 3)

c. TF 1-11 Inf continued rocket suppression and rice denial operations south of Quang Tri Combat Base through 21 July 71. The battalion then began to redeploy its companies to assume bunker line sectors previously occupied by the 1-77 Armor and 1-61 Infantry. Additionally, one rifle company was employed as security for the Quang Tri Combat Base ASP. One rifle company and P-75th Ranger teams continued operating in the Quang Tri Rocket Belt until 21 July 71. With the return of D/1-11 from TF 1-61 on 21 July the entire southern half of QTCB was manned by the 1st Bn, 11th Infantry.

d. TF 3-5 assumed responsibility for AO Green on 25 June 71. Since the 3-5 Cav was not ordered to stand down, the squadron was attached to the 101st Abn (Ambl) on 1 July 71, but was returned OPCON to the 1-5 Inf on the same date. Primarily, the squadron deployed to the west and south of Quang Tri to conduct screening and security missions. On 25 July, two troops were moved to Quang Tri to assume bunker line security and relief of the 1-11 Infantry. Eventually, three troops of armored cavalry were deployed around the QTCB bunker line as the rest of the Brigade entered standdown. TF 3-5 Cav was returned to 101st Abn on 30 July 1971, but retained security mission for QTCB. (Figure 4)

e. The 5th Bn, 4th Arty continued providing direct support artillery to the Brigade through 29 July. Batteries B, C, and A entered standdown as each of the maneuver battalions they supported were relieved of their tactical missions. Additionally, other Brigade units such as 517th MID, 75th Spt Bn and HHC, 1-5 (M) continued bunker line duty through 3 Aug, 8 Aug and 5 Aug respectively.

5. Summary.

a. The month of June and early part of July was a period of intense enemy activity in the Brigade Area of Operations. This necessitated a careful appraisal of how to meet the standdown schedule and at the same time provide adequate security in a period of high enemy activity, as well as continuing to provide ARVN with heavy fire support to assist them in stabilizing their areas of responsibility. What emerged was a condition in which combat battalions literally went from active operations on fire bases on one day to a standdown and processing situation on the next with very little time for transition between the two. This was successfully accomplished.

b. It is also pertinent to mention that despite the unusual environment which characterized the posture of the Brigade during its standdown, units remaining in contact retained their combat effectiveness, morale and discipline to the end. There were no instances within the units of the Brigade in which flagging morale and discipline created problems for the command. To the contrary, all units went about their tasks in a highly commandable manner.

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APPENDIX I (Task Organization) to ANNEX D (Operations) to 1st Bde, 5th
Inf Div (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

The Task Organization shown below was the initial organization during the reporting period. However, the composition varied throughout the period.

TF 1-11 Inf

TF 1-61 Inf (M)

1-61 Inf (M)
B/3-5 Cav
A/1-77 Arm
D/1-11 Inf

TF 3-5 Cav

3-5 Cav (-)

TF 1-77 Arm

1-77 Arm (-)
A/4-12 Cav (Atch)

Brigade Control

5-4 Arty (DS)
75th Spt Bn
D/3-5 Air Cav (OPCON)
A/7th Engr
P/75th Rangers
43rd Sct Dog Plt
Det 2/7th PSYOPS Bn
86th Chem Det
407th RRD
517th MID
Bde Sec Plt
Bde Avn Sect
Avn Spt Pkg, 101st Abn Div (AMBL) OPCON
Bde TACP (USAF)




FIGURE 1

DISPOSITION OF FORCES ON DAY OF NOTIFICATION OF REDEPLOYMENT




FIGURE 2

25 Jun: Turnover of Mai Loc Operating Base to 248 VNMCM Brigade




FIGURE 3

8-10 Jul: FSB's C2 and A4, AO Orange turned over to ARVN
 11 Jul: FSB Anne, AO White turned over to 101st Abn Div (AM)
 11-21 Jul: 1-11 Inf continued company-sized operations in newly designated AO Red




FIGURE 4

TAOI turnover completed on
 21 Jul as last element of 1-11 Inf returned from AO Red to
 QTCB for standdown
 21 Jul: 1-77 Arm completed redeployment

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ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL:

a. The primary logistical effort during redeployment was to assist units in preparation for standdown by offering guidance in the preparation of the paper work needed to turn in equipment; arranging for the transportation of all equipment and personnel from the Quang Tri Combat Base to either Da Nang, in the case of Keystone Equipment, or Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay for personnel; the shipment of hold baggage; the establishment of an out-processing point at Da Nang during the closing days of standdown; the establishment of both a US and ARVN PCS Point to facilitate the turn-in of PCS Property at Quang Tri rather than Da Nang; the establishment of a Property Disposal Yard at Quang Tri to prevent the necessity of transporting the equipment to Phu Bai; coordination of transportation to insure units were able to clear areas after all equipment had been turned into Keystone; and the police of Quang Tri Combat Base to insure the maximum amount of equipment was recovered and returned to the Military Supply System.

b. USARV OPLAN 183-70, USASUPCOM PLAN 6-71, and USASUPCOM-DNG, Letter 10 May 71, Subject; Equipment turn-in Procedures (Keystone) were used as guides for the writing of the logistical portion of Brigade OPLAN 183-70. While the plans provided guidance and policy, in several areas the distance of the Brigade from the originally designated turn-in points necessitated continued coordination to develop a plan which would allow the Brigade to complete standdown by its designated date with a minimum of hardship. This plan was finally developed and put into effect as the first unit entered standdown.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS: The problem facing the Brigade S4 was to move a separate Brigade and its equipment from a field combat configuration to a central location, prepare the units for standdown, and then move unit equipment 125 miles to Da Nang for turn-in to the Keystone Processing Points. While equipment was being turned in at Da Nang, simultaneously at Quang Tri Combat Base PCS equipment and secondary items were being categorized and turned in as well as personnel being processed and all real estate cleared. In addition the normal billeting and feeding of the members of the Brigade had to be maintained on a scheduled basis throughout the standdown period.

a. Upon official designation as a Keystone Oriole (Bravo) Unit, each subordinate element was directed to begin turning in excess equipment and items which in the opinion of the unit commander, were not mission essential.

b. Units entered a standdown posture at Quang Tri Combat Base and Dong Ha Combat Base and prepared to turn in all equipment either at Quang Tri or Da Nang. Each unit established a standdown schedule which included the correction of deficiencies at organizational level as well as the removal of all

ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIGLE (BRAVO)

unauthorized modifications from vehicles. Units were then "SCRAMED" and all paper work prepared for items to be turned into Da Nang before they departed Quang Tri.

c. Equipment was moved by land and sea to Da Nang for turn in. At the same time equipment was turned in at Quang Tri to zero the property book and real estate. All personnel were processed out and transportation provided as units stood down.

3. DISCUSSION: Prior to official notification of standdown the S4 provided an officer to the Brigade Redeployment Planning Group (RPG). The group was charged with the responsibility of finalizing a plan for either redeployment or standdown of units of the Brigade. Coordination was made with XXIV Corps and Da Nang Support Command regarding the support that would be required and the locations that would be operated to accept equipment turn-ins. The following problem areas were not resolved until shortly before the first unit of the Brigade commenced standdown:

(1) A firm route of movement to Da Nang was not established. Determination to move units by land, sea, or a combination of both had to be made. It was not deemed feasible to road march the 232 tracked vehicles of the Brigade to Da Nang. Final approval on the route of march for tracked vehicles to Tan My Port was not granted until 30 June.

(2) Transportation augmentation would be required to move equipment to Keystone Processing Point (KPP) in Da Nang. It was requested that Da Nang Support Command provide a medium truck company to provide direct support to the Brigade.

(3) Da Nang Support Command was requested to establish a Post Camp, and Station (PCS) turn-in point and a Property Disposal Activity on Quang Tri Combat Base. These services would facilitate the turn-in of equipment and significantly reduce the line haul transportation that would be required during the standdown period. On 26 June 71, information was received that a PCS turn-in point and a PDO holding activity would be established at Quang Tri. With the establishment of these facilities the transportation requirements for the Brigade were reduced by approximately 60%. This was a significant contribution to the accomplishment of the standdown within the prescribed time frame.

(4) Da Nang Support Command was requested to provide a hold baggage team to process Brigade and other standdown units in the Quang Tri area. A team arrived on or about 10 July to process hold baggage.

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ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORICIE (BRAVO)

b. Implementation of Standdown:

(1) Permission was granted by USARV to laterally transfer PCS and secondary items not required by US Forces to RVNAF on a "no cost" basis. All items were inspected by Keystone personnel. At that time the decision was made as to whether the item was eligible to be transferred to RVNAF or to be retained in the Army Supply System. Items were then accepted by an I Corps Area Logistics Command (ALC) Advisor. The completed paperwork was routed to the Keystone personnel and turn-in credit was provided to the unit.

(2) The following actions were taken to prepare units for standdown:

(a) Unit inventories that had been initially prepared in May were distributed for updating and returned on 18 June. Units were required to update all hand receipts by 25 June and final corrections were made to the inventory just prior to the unit entering standdown.

(b) Prior to standing down all unit supply personnel participated in a conference with the Brigade S4 Section to discuss their method of operation, time phasing, known and potential problem areas, task force organization, and lessons learned from previous units.

(c) To "SCRAM" all items of equipment two teams were provided. The 75th Support Battalion was responsible for inspecting and classifying major items of equipment and the Keystone Battalion inspected all PCS and secondary items. Both teams inspected on site, based on appointments that coincided with the requirements of the unit. The Brigade Maintenance Officer was assigned the staff responsibility of instructing units in the procedures for preparing documentation, scheduling inspection teams, and ensuring that all documentation was properly prepared before the unit moved to Danang.

(d) Keystone Liaison Team: A team consisting of 3 officers and 48 enlisted men were sent to Danang to function as the Brigade Liaison team and provide assistance to the Keystone Battalion. It was the responsibility of the liaison team to provide a focal point for units turning in equipment, to obtain billeting, develop schedules for processing items through the KPP, and receiving any other assistance required for coordination with the Keystone Battalion. Additionally, records inspectors were provided to give documentation a final check before the equipment entered the processing points.

(e) Reporting Procedures on Turn-in of Equipment:

(1) Prior to the units departure for Danang a report was submitted daily by the supply officer to Brigade S4 showing the number of items turned in at Quang Tri. These reports were consolidated at Brigade and posted to two different charts. The charts were posted in the evening for briefing the Commanding General the next morning.

ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

(2) As each unit departed to Da Nang with their equipment the supply sergeant continued to report daily the turn-in of equipment in Quang Tri. The Property Book Officer submitted reports at close of business each day to the Liaison Team at Da Nang. The reports reflected two different areas. One report reflected the number of items he had received credit for during that day and the other reflected the number of items that Keystone had accepted without turn-in credit. This information was relayed to Brigade each evening and posted to the charts. By utilizing both figures the Brigade could accurately determine progress both for Property Book Credit and the total number of items turned in awaiting paperwork.

(f) Supply Procedures: See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

(g) Transportation: See Appendix 2 to this Annex.

(h) Food Service Operations: The food service office coordinated a feeding plan through the S4 to ensure that all redeploying units had continuous feeding during the standdown period. Coordination was made with all unit commanders to hold mess personnel as long as possible through standdown to keep the mess halls in operation. At this point, the unit mess schedule for redeployment was put into effect. Coordination was also made with Mess Officers and the Class I Officer for the turn-in of excess food supplies to the Class I Point. All excess food supplies were inventoried and recorded on DA Form 3161 (Request for Issue and Turn-in) and turned in to the Class I Yard. The Food Service Officer also supervised the turn-in of every unit's basic load of meal, combat, individual. Each unit's mess hall was checked to insure that all TOE equipment was turned in and that the building was thoroughly cleaned at the termination of each unit's standdown. A final review of mess records was conducted for the 17 messes of the Brigade. A letter of release was provided the responsible commander and a copy was filed in the unit's permanent file.

4. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS: See APPENDIX 3

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APPENDIX 1 (Supply Procedures) to ANNEX E (logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO) After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this appendix is to evaluate the supply activities associated with the redeployment of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

2. GENERAL:

a. The primary effort of the Brigade Supply Office during redeployment was to continue normal support operations, cancel requisitions, and turn-in stocks to depot. Normal support did diminish with the redeployment of units; however, at no time was the Brigade Supply Office able to devote its total capabilities to turn-in of stocks and balancing out its records.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. In the initial planning no specific guidelines for redployment of a DSU could be found in OPLANS. The Bde Supply Office therefore established its own priorities for turn-in of the different classes of supply. Guide lines were set down by Da Nang Support Command for the gradual phase out and cancellation of requisitions. These guidelines were followed with changes incorporated according to the situation. Disposition instructions for every line item were requested in the form of routing identification code FTE.

b. All transportation requests were forwarded through S3, 75th Spt Bn to MCC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M). It should be noted that during redeployment the Brigade Supply Office turned in to USADD 904 line items, 526 ASL and 378 fringe, with a total of 2,253 shorts tons. Prior to actual notification the Brigade Supply Office had taken several steps to reduce excess supplies and equipment. This was a distinct advantage considering the time frame of redeployment.

c. The DSU continued normal operations until 9 August 1971. On this date the BSO ceased issue operations and moved from Camp Roberts to the vicinity of the PDO at Camp Red Devil. The BSO continued to accept turn-in of CTA 50-901 from units until the completion of redeployment.

d. Support During Redeployment:

(1) Class I

(a) The Class I distribution point operated by the 625th S&S Company (Non Bde) continued to support all units until completion of standdown. As individual unit mess halls closed, the remaining personnel were either supported by non Brigade units or "C" Rations were provided.

(b) Class I posed no problems throughout standdown.

APPENDIX 1 (Supply Procedures) to ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Bde, 5th Inf
Div (M) KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO) After Action Report

(2) Class II:

(a) All class II support continued to be provided by the Brigade Supply Office during redeployment. ASL had to be gradually reduced corresponding to unit standdown.

(b) The Brigade Supply Office continued to accept turn-in of TA 50-901 up until completion of standdown which made its own redeployment very difficult.

(3) Class III:

(a) Packaged Class III was turned-in to 848 QM Plt (non Bde)

(b) The 848th QM PLT continued to provide all class III support for the Brigade.

(4) Class IV: Class IV support involved a gradual draw-down of stocks corresponding to units standdown. Even though there was little requirement to provide additional Class IV once units started standdown, it was the opinion that certain items such as concertina wire and sand bags should be kept in reserve for emergencies.

(5) Class V: All ammunition within the Brigade was turned-in, expended, or transferred during standdown.

(a) Class V support was provided by the Danang Support Command. The bulk of the Class V turn-in including those of all of the combat battalions was closed during the Brigade's standdown and remaining quantities of Class V within the Brigade were moved by organic transportation for turn-in at ASP's at Camp Evans and Phu Bai. During standdown small quantities of Class V were transferred to remaining US units; and during the turnover of firebase Charlie-2, artillery and small arms ammunition were transferred to ARVN forces. This transfer was beneficial to both US and ARVN; it allowed a reduction in the amount of US transportation required and also provided ARVN with the capability of beginning immediate operations with the necessary reserve of Class V on hand. Prior to standdown, arrangements had been made for condition coding and destruction of unserviceable ammunition at the forward fire base locations. Condition coding was provided by the OAC Ammunition Surveillance Inspector at Quang Tri and destruction was performed by elements of the 59th EOD detachment at Quang Tri. Destruction in the field allowed significant savings of time, transportation, and labor.

(b) Documentation and Accountability: For the Brigade's standdown, permission was received from the Danang Support Command to revert to the use of the DA Form 581 (Request for Issue and Turn-in of Ammunition) rather than the normally required use of DA Form 2765-1 (Request for Use of Turn-in). The DA Form 581 significantly reduced the amount of documentation required

APPENDIX 1 (Supply Procedures) to ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO) After Action Report

for turn-in because many types of ammunition could be listed on the form rather than only one type as with the DA Form 2765-1. In order to simply and efficiently relieve units of Class V property book accountability, a procedure was arranged with the Danang Support Command allowing the units to prepare two DA Form 581s; the first turning-in the class V basic load and the second receiving the same class V as an operational load. This procedure allowed units to clear the Class V on their property books with one document.

(c) Problems: No significant problems were encountered with Class V during the period of standdown.

(6) Class VI: Requirement for sundry packs was reduced as units moved from a combat standdown posture. No problems were encountered.

(7) Class VII: The issue of major end items to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M), ceased upon notification of standdown. No problems were encountered.

(8) Class VIII: Normal medical support was provided by Company B, 75th Spt Battalion until 1 August 71. After 1 Aug 71 Medical support was provided from Phu Bai.

(9) Class IX:

(a) The DSU for maintenance cancelled all requisitions and turned in items IAW USARV OPLAN 183-70. The DSU's records were transported to HQ, USARV and the NCR 500 was laterally transferred to another DSU.

(b) Repair parts not on hand at the DSU could be ordered from the 63d Maint Bn on a "fill or kill" basis. This arrangement was not completely satisfactory due to the fact that the 63d Maint DSU was reducing stocks at the same time. Near the end of standdown vehicles had to be towed or hauled to Danang for turn-in because adequate repair parts were not available.

(10) Graves Registration:

(a) Graves Registration Support was provided by Co C, 75th Spt Bn until 29 July 71.

(b) Phu Bai provided Graves Registration Support after C Co 75th Spt Bn completed its standdown.

(11) Property Disposal: Danang Support Command established a PDO yard at Quang Tri for the Bde. This was extremely helpful in that it did not require units to transport unserviceable items to Phu Bai or Danang.

APPENDIX 2 (Transportation) to ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOIE (BRAVO)

1. GENERAL: The Brigade Movement Control Office was responsible for establishing transportation requirements for the units within the Brigade; for coordinating the movement of personnel by air to Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang for DEROS and in-country transfers; for coordinating the movement of heavy equipment and track vehicles by sea from Cornfield Ramp and Tan My Port to Deepwater Pier in Da Nang; for establishing convoy control procedures for unit convoys moving to Tan My and Da Nang; for shipping hold baggage of personnel in the Brigade; and for coordinating transportation support for final police of the combat base prior to its turn over.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS: The Movement Control Office was tasked to plan and coordinate the movement of a separate mechanized Infantry Brigade 125 miles from Quang Tri to the Keystone Turn-in Point located in Da Nang, and the movement of some 4,400 personnel by air to in-country transfer locations or to Cam Ranh Bay for DEROS.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Water/Land Movement of Equipment:

(1) At the beginning of standdown planning, the MCO and Brigade S 4 attended a meeting at HQ, U.SASUPCOM, Da Nang. Discussed at this meeting was the possibility of moving the heavy track vehicles by water across Dong Ha Ramp or Wonder Beach. In his research, the AC of S, Trans, had found both locations unsuitable because of underwater hazards. The AC of S, Trans, suggested a road march from Quang Tri to the north bank of the Perfume River in Hue. Cornfield Ramp was a small ramp located on the north side of the river. It could be used to load equipment on YFU's and ferried down river to Tan My Ramp, the nearest deep water loading ramp. The Brigade requested a survey made of all bridges to be crossed. It was found that the last two bridges were below required weight classification. In stating this problem to XXIV Corps, another survey was made and the Brigade was given authorization to cross the bridges by using risk crossings. XXIV Corps also stated that all track vehicles must be loaded at Cornfield Ramp and only track vehicles being transported on trucks could go through the city of Hue. The route for track vehicles was established.

(2) The road route for all convoys had to be along QL1, the only road between Quang Tri, Hue, and Da Nang. It was a hard top, high speed, two lane road through densely populated coastal area of northern MRI. This route was very suitable for convoy travel with one obstacle, the Hai Van Pass. The long climb to the top and descent slowed traffic considerably but posed no real problem. Route reconnaissance was made in detail by both air and ground. The convoy time averaged between seven and eight hours. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that only one vehicle was involved in an accident resulting in injury; investigation revealed that it was not the fault of the US driver.

APPENDIX 2 (Transportation) to ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div
(M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVG)

driver. (See TAB A for recapitulation)

(3) Convoy control for the Brigade was established by the Brigade MCC. A detailed briefing was given to each convoy commander the day prior to departure to insure close internal control of the convoys and to alert the convoy commander to situations that could arise and suggested courses of action. Close coordination was made with 504th MP Bn and USASUPCOM MCC field office in Quang Tri to provide the necessary security for the convoys. In addition, coordination was made with the Brigade Aviation section to provide gunship cover on call to the convoy commander if necessary. Each convoy had an aircraft above it to aid the convoy commander with control. Strip maps and a series of check points were provided each convoy commander to enable him to call in his location so his progress could be checked. Representatives from the Brigade MCC traveled with a large percentage of the convoys to assist the convoy commander in control. A communication network was researched and established by the Bde Signal Office. This was not entirely effective because the units on the other nets could not be raised at all times.

(4) All vehicle movement was organized into convoys for control and security purposes. Convoys generally were run smoothly with only minor corrections having to be made. There were a total of 14 track convoys to Cornfield Ramp and 14 wheel convoys to Da Nang. During the period 1 July through 13 August there were five occurrences that delayed movement for a time; two typhoons, one tropical storm, and two student demonstrations in the city of Hue.

(5) In planning the transportation requirements for the Brigade during standdown, close coordination was made with the units. The unit submitted to the MCC the number of S&P loads it would take to move their unit equipment. This included PC&S property and PDO equipment which had to be taken to Phu Bai some 50 miles from Quang Tri as well as TOE equipment that had to be turned in to Keystone in Da Nang, some 125 miles away. The number of S&Ps required was approximately 800. During the final planning of standdown, USASUPCOM established a PC&S turn in point at Quang Tri as well as a PDO yard. This cut the number of loads that would have to be transported by line-haul assets to about 200. The PC&S and PDO equipment could be transported by organic vehicles of the Brigade until 8 August when all vehicles were either turned in or being prepared for final movement to Da Nang. Prior to establishing a PC&S turn-in point and a PDO yard, USASUPCOM planned to augment the Brigade with a medium truck company and 60 Roll On-Roll Off trailers. With the drastic cut in required transportation, the truck company was not activated and only a portion of the trailers were used. USASUPCOM transportation carried 168 S&P loads and 12 - 5 ton cargo loads of equipment to Da Nang for the Brigade. This amounted to approximately 1,500 tons of cargo moved in 43 days.

APPENDIX 2 (Transportation) to ANNEX E (Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M), After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

b. Air Transportation of Personnel: Upon learning that the Brigade had become a USARV assets and all personnel were to be transferred to other units within Vietnam or allowed to DEROS, the question of how to move some 4,400 troops from Quang Tri to the gaining units was posed. The MCO coordinated closely with the Brigade AG to find out the number of personnel that would be out-processed daily and on what days they would be available for transportation. On 19 June the MCO met with representatives of MACV Transportation Management Agency to discuss the possibility of reserving a block of seats on the two regularly scheduled C-123's that landed at Quang Tri daily. TMA said that this would put a hardship on other units in the area because those flights were operated on the same concepts as a civilian air line. It had to be on a first come, first served basis in order not to upset the transportation system in which those two flights operated. TMA suggested that MCO should submit a Special Mission Air request if a certain number of personnel could be available for the flight at a certain time. The request would have to be made three to five days in advance, but TMA cautioned that the US Air Force had to have a 72 hour period in which to fly the mission. The personnel waiting for the flight may have to wait the 72 hours before their flight arrived. Also discussed was the destinations of the SMAR's. It was decided that since some personnel were being reassigned to MR I and the balance were going to DEROS or be transferred to MR III, that one flight, a C-123 capable of carrying 42 passengers, be requested for Da Nang, and a C-130, carrying 85 passengers, be requested for Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Both flights were requested for mid-afternoon to enable the Brigade AG Section to have the entire morning to complete the out processing of the 75 to 180 personnel that were scheduled for a particular day. The flights were to occur on a daily basis from 5 July to 15 August. After the first few days the flights arrived with regularity, however on a number of occasions, flights were cancelled because of High winds in Quang Tri. (the runway at Quang Tri is constructed at a 90° perpendicular to the prevailing western wind) To alleviate backlogs, CH-47's were requested to transport personnel to Da Nang.

c. Hold Baggage: When standdown began the Brigade was operating the only Hold Baggage Section north of Phu Bai. This served some 10,000 troops located in the Quang Tri vicinity. The section was staffed by one NCO and two enlisted men who were responsible for inspecting, packing, loading and safeguarding the personal items tendered for shipment as well as preparing the proper documentation. It was believed that with standdown this section would have to be augmented by personnel from USASUPCOM, Da Nang. In meeting with USASUPCOM it was agreed that the Brigade would continue to operate the facility until completion of standdown, and USASUPCOM would augment the section with 9 personnel trained in the processing and packing of household goods. When the Brigade had completed standdown, these personnel would take over the facility and operate it for the remainder of the units in Quang Tri. During the standdown period the Brigade Hold Baggage Section processed the personal property of some 1,034 personnel of which 529 shipped hold baggage and 505 shipped property by parcel post.

d. Recapitulation of transportation. See Tab A

TAB A to Appendix 2 (Transportation) to Annex E (Logistics) to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO).

RECAPITULATION OF TRANSPORTATION UTILIZED

1. Number of track vehicles that moved by road to Tan My and by water to Da Nang - - - - - 188
2. Number of organic wheeled vehicles traveling by convoy to Da Nang - - - 384
3. Number of C-123's utilized to transport personnel - - - - - 22
4. Number of C-130's utilized to transport personnel - - - - - 31
5. Number of CH-47's utilized to transport personnel - - - - - 14
6. Number of LST's utilized to transport equipment - - - - - 6
7. Number of YFU's utilized to transport equipment - - - - - 24

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APPENDIX 3 (Problems, Lessons Learned and Recommendations) to ANNEX E
(Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action
Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

1. 100% UNIT INVENTORY:

a. Problem: The 100% inventories submitted by units were not accurate and caused difficulty in maintaining accurate status on the turn-in of equipment. Initially units could not be told that the inventory was for standdown due to the classification of the overall plan.

b. Lessons Learned: The 100% inventories must reflect the property on hand to include both excesses and shortages. The format of the inventory outlined in USARV OPLAN is not specific enough for inexperienced property book officers.

c. Recommendations: Specific oral and written instructions must be given each property book officer to insure report is properly prepared. Additionally an experienced PBO (warrant officer) should work with each unit to insure the report is correct. Recommend format in USARV OPLAN 183-70 be changed to Commodity Managerial Code to facilitate reporting procedures both at unit and Keystone level. Initial portion of the notification regarding logistics should be immediately down graded to a workable classification.

2. SHORT LEAD-TIME FROM NOTIFICATION TO STANDDOWN OF FIRST UNIT:

a. Problem: Time for initial units to plan for standdown and turn-in excess equipment was inadequate.

b. Lessons Learned: The first units to standdown did so with 2 weeks notification and were required to handle essential equipment, non-essential and excess. Units with more time were able to turn-in non-essential and excess items before their established turn-in dates concurrent with personnel shipments, thereby reducing the number of personnel originally deemed required to complete unit standdown.

c. Recommendations: That more time be granted to units to make their initial plans and longer free turn-in period be granted to units in standdown.

3. EXCESS UNIT EQUIPMENT:

a. Problem: Excess equipment causes problems throughout the standdown.

b. Lessons Learned: Throughout the standdown period, unit equipment began to appear in unauthorized locations and/or to unauthorized individuals. All units were instructed to establish amnesty areas where excess items could be placed with no paper work involved. The unit headquarters then had the responsibility of separating the equipment by category, preparing the paper work and turning it in to the respective agency. All trash dumps

APPENDIX 3 (Problems, Lessons Learned and Recommendations) to ANNEX E
(Logistics) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action
Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

had guards with instructions to search vehicles entering the dump to insure only authorized items were discarded. With one exception, all base gates were closed, and all vehicles leaving the post were examined for unauthorized equipment. This greatly facilitated equipment being turned-in through proper channels and reduced loss of government property.

c. Recommendations: That standdown units exercise extreme caution in controlling excess equipment to insure maximum return to the supply system.

4. EQUIPMENT FOR THE DA NANG OUT-PROCESSING POINT:

a. Problem: Equipment for the Da Nang Out-processing Point, due to its late start, necessitated action to provide equipment from unit assets.

b. Lessons Learned: In order to facilitate personnel out-processing, a point was established in Da Nang from which individuals could either be sent to a new unit within Vietnam or Cam Ranh Bay for DEROS. When the decision was made to establish the point no equipment was available to operate the point. Through coordination with both XXIV Corps and Da Nang Support Command, units were allowed to turn-in equipment to the Keystone Point and receive credit for turn-in. Keystone, in turn, allowed the out-processing center to hand receipt the needed equipment and return same at the completion of its operation.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That one out-processing point be established adjacent to a Keystone facility to expedite out-processing of personnel comprising equipment turn-in details at the MIPP and SIPP. This eliminates the necessity for personnel to return to their original location for out-processing.

(2) That equipment be made available by the Support Command for the out-processing points.

5. DUPLICATE SCRAMMING OF WEAPONS:

a. Problem: Units entering the turn-in phase of standdown reported to Brigade S-4 that all SCRAMS completed at Quang Tri Combat Base were disregarded and redone by Keystone resulting in a duplication of effort for all concerned.

b. Lessons Learned: Prior to the beginning of standdown the Brigade was informed that weapons must be scrambled by the Brigade DSU prior to being sent to Keystone. As the first two units entered standdown, it became apparent that the SCRAMS were being disregarded and redone by Keystone. As a result

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of conferences between the Brigade Maintenance Officer and Keystone, the problem was resolved by having the SCRAM accomplished only by Keystone.

c. Recommendations: That continued coordination be effected between the standdown unit and Keystone, and definite policies be established and followed.

6. UNIT CLEARANCE:

a. Problem: Clearing Units after unit organic transportation had been turned-in.

b. Lessons Learned: Prior to standdown, the Brigade experienced a shortage of transportation assets. With the turn-in of organic transportation, transportation for the clearance of unit areas became an acute problem. This problem was partially alleviated by the use of transportation from the organic Support Battalion, controlled by the Movement Control Officer, and allocated to units on a as needed basis.

c. Recommendation: That local drayage be allocated by USASUPCOM to units throughout standdown on a as needed basis. This is particularly critical when there is great distance from the standdown location to the Keystone Turn-in Point since transportation cannot be held for utilization to the last minute.

7. CANCELLED FLIGHTS:

a. Problem: Flights were cancelled without notification to the Brigade, causing a backlog of personnel for shipment.

b. Lessons Learned: Due to the distance of Quang Tri from units to which in-country transfer personnel were traveling or to Cam Ranh Bay for DEROS personnel, it was necessary to rely heavily on air transportation. When flights were cancelled without prior notification to the Brigade, the MCO immediately contacted MACVTMA at Tan Son Nhut Air Base to learn the reason for the cancellation and the probability of getting a replacement aircraft. Some reasons for cancellation were the crew day for the aircraft had ended while the airplane was at Cam Ranh Bay; maintenance problems with the aircraft; a mission of higher priority forcing cancellation; bad weather either at Quang Tri or the point of origin of the aircraft. In one instance no explanation was given. In such instances, CH-47 Helicopters were utilized to transport personnel to Da Nang, thus reducing the backlog at the out-processing point. When replacement aircraft were obtained, they arrived at Quang Tri between 2400 hours and 0700 hours the day following the original scheduled date of the flight.

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c. Recommendations:

(1) That every aspect of flight scheduling be closely studied to ascertain problems which adverse weather may cause in air movement of personnel.

(2) Close coordination with MACV-TMA and USAF Headquarters should be maintained to provide immediate awareness of pending developments.

(3) A higher priority should be granted to standdown units to insure transportation is available as scheduled.

8. LACK OF CONTROL OVER NON-ORGANIC TRANSPORTATION:

a. Problem: The lack of control of equipment when transporting it on S&P trailers provided by USASUPCOM at times caused delay in the transfer of equipment to Da Nang.

b. Lessons Learned: To alleviate the problem of excess transport time, USASUPCOM vehicles were integrated into convoys that were organized and controlled by the Brigade. This insured all equipment, vehicles, and drivers were under the Brigade control from the point of departure to final destination thereby mitigating the possibility of delayed equipment. If vehicles could not be placed in Brigade convoys, reliable individuals from the brigade were placed in each vehicle to accompany the equipment from Quang Tri to Da Nang.

c. Recommendations: That all equipment hauled by non-organic support assets be integrated into unit convoys to insure speed of delivery and security of equipment. At a minimum, individuals should accompany all non-organic transportation to insure arrival at final destination.

9. LOCAL DRAYAGE:

a. Problem: After 8 August, there were no organic vehicles available for local drayage due to their preparation for Keystone.

b. Lessons Learned: After discussions with AC of S (Trans), USASUPCOM, and G4 (Trans), XXIV Corps, it was concluded that the Brigade would require a minimum of five 2½ ton trucks daily for equipment turn-in at Quang Tri and the police of the Combat Base prior to relinquishing control and responsibility to incoming units. These assets were provided by USASUPCOM from 8 August until 17 August. During the period 1 July through 8 August a total of 96 S&P's and 223 2½ ton trucks were dispatched by the Brigade Support Battalion to augment Keystoning units with local drayage. Since

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the PC&S turn-in point and the PDO yard were located at Quang Tri, the trucks made an average of 6 trips each day to these facilities. This enabled the Brigade to transport PC&S and PDO equipment to turn-in points and receive turn-in credit with minimum problems.

c. Recommendations: Standdown plans should provide for augmenting transportation assets with local drayage since the Keystoning unit will have turned-in its organic vehicles prior to unit area turnover to the post installation coordinator.

10. REPAIR PARTS SUPPLY DURING REDEPLOYMENT:

a. Problem: As redeployment progressed and the supporting DSU Tech Supply packed and shipped its stock, some items became critical. This became particularly evident when the NCR 500 system was removed from operation following the inventory by USARV.

b. Lessons Learned: Repair parts support for units redeploying last was arranged through non-divisional DSU's which were not redeploying. This support was on a "fill or kill" basis and no signature cards, density lists, or PLL listings were required. This provided a source for those items required for equipment repair after PLL stocks had been expended or turned-in.

c. Recommendations:

(1) Shipping of stocks by a redeploying DSU should be done on a selective basis. This can be done before the actual standdown period for the DSU, provided that supported units with peculiar equipment are among the first to redeploy. For example, the DSU was among the last to redeploy, however the M48A3 peculiar parts were pulled, packed and shipped concurrently with the standdown of the first unit (1-77 Armor Battalion), the only unit with the M48A3's.

(2) The availability date of the NCR 500 system should be planned later in the redeployment operation to assure maximum availability of repair parts support through normal channels, and supplementary sources established on a "fill or kill" basis.

(3) Permanent support for residual units should be established early in redeployment to allow maximum transfer of demand history and peculiar stockage items to gaining DSU from the redeploying DSU.

11. TRASH CLEAN-UP:

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a. Problem: There were significant amounts of US Army and Marine Corps equipment - vehicles, trailers, and miscellaneous parts found at various areas on Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases. The US Marine Corps equipment was, for the most part, buried and not within the recovery capabilities of the Brigade. Although accumulated over a four year period, most of the US Army equipment appeared to be the result of stolen vehicles and trailers which had been stripped for parts and abandoned during Operation Lam Son 719 in 1971. The equipment was unserviceable, and, in most cases, only useful as salvage metal; however, it was necessary under current regulations to recover it. The assets needed to affect recovery had to come from the Brigade's redeployment assets. This put an additional burden on units in preparing for redeployment.

b. Lessons Learned: Initially a survey was made of Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases to determine what assets would be necessary to accomplish the task. Dong Ha Combat Base had very little US Army equipment, but it did have the bulk of the buried Marine Corps equipment. The location and estimate of the amount of US Marine Corps equipment was reported to XXIV Corps Headquarters. Quang Tri Combat Base contained the bulk of the US Army equipment. To affect its recovery, specific areas of responsibility were assigned to Brigade units. The Installation Engineer recovered the equipment from the authorized trash dump and those areas on post which were not part of any particular unit's area of responsibility.

c. Recommendations: The combat base should be divided into areas of unit responsibility. The Installation Engineer should be in control of and responsible for the authorized trash dump. Daily inspections should be made by all units to insure timely reporting of buried equipment and the recovery of abandoned vehicles. The authorized trash dump should be fenced in with only one entrance so that a guard would have complete control over all dumping of trash. Units using the trash dump should be required to dump at specific points in the dump area. Vehicles entering the trash dump should be logged in and out. These actions combined with periodic checks of the trash dump should prevent the discarding of un-serviceable, recoverable equipment that should remain in logistics channels.

12. CONEX CONTAINERS:

a. Problem: At the beginning of standdown the Brigade had approximately 800 CONEX containers to move that were in widely scattered locations, and in varied conditions ranging from serviceable to scrap.

b. Lessons Learned: In coordination with the 63rd Maintenance Battalion, which was responsible for the movement of serviceable and economically repairable CONEXES, a central location was established for the

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staging of CONEXES. To further facilitate handling, all CONEX containers were marked on location with a symbol to represent which criteria the CONEX met: PDO, Economically Repairable or Serviceable. When all CONEXES were marked, a team was dispatched from the Brigade S-4 with vehicles and forklifts to pick up all CONEXES from unit areas and move them to the staging area. The end result was that all CONEXES within the Brigade were readily identified as to the number, location, criteria and were removed in an efficient manner.

c. Recommendations: CONEXES should be categorized, clearly marked, and placed in a central location for further shipment. A team from the Brigade S-4 should be tasked to procure the CONEX containers from the units thus insuring maximum utilization and efficiency of available transportation assets.

13. INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS:

a. Problem: Equipment turn-in dates preceded personnel departure dates thus leaving personnel on the combat base without a weapon.

b. Lessons Learned: To insure personnel remained armed until departure 200 weapons (M-16's) were hand receipted from the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), and were returned by the last unit to standdown. Brigade S-4 monitored distribution during unit turn-in and the Roll-up Force monitored the return of the weapons.

c. Recommendations: That outside assets be utilized to provide a pool of weapons to insure unit property turn-in without completely disarming the remaining personnel.

14. UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL:

a. Problem: The most serious problem for units at the Da Nang turn-in point was in its selection of personnel to complete the turn-in of equipment at the SIPP and MIPP.

b. Lessons Learned: Personnel operating 125 miles away from their parent unit under the supervision of junior commanders must be properly motivated. Those personnel transferring in-country to complete a tour were not interested in meeting assigned turn-in completion dates and required constant prodding. Those personnel due to DEROS and who had periods curtailed from their normal tour were the mainstays of the program.

c. Recommendations: That personnel with in-country transfers be shipped in the earliest part of standdown and personnel eligible for DEROS curtailment be utilized for equipment turn-in details and be curtailed after the equipment turn-in is complete.

ANNEX F (Civil-Military Operation) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
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1. GENERAL: The goal of the Brigade S-5 during the redeployment was to insure completion of the transfer of all Civic Action projects to the local government, with as little adverse impact as possible. Coordination was made to insure the continuation of psychological operations in support of units operating in Quang Tri Province.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

a. Upon notification of redeployment the Brigade S-5 made a review of Brigade sponsored projects to insure all were completed. Those that could use additional support were given first priority of available materials. Coordination was made with MACV Team #19 Advisors to insure a continuation of support for the Civic Action Program in this area.

b. Psychological operations concerning the redeployment of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) were conducted by Province S-5 with guidance by Brigade S-5 and support from the Vietnamese Information Service.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Civic Action:

(1) During the months prior to redeployment the Civic Action program of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) maintained a low posture with the intention of completing all projects sponsored by units of the Brigade. In accordance with the Combined Campaign Plan for 1971, no new projects were initiated which could not be completed in a reasonably short time. All assistance provided was in support of Province projects or Brigade projects which could use continued support. Because of this type of operation all projects were completed prior to redeployment. When subordinate units of the Brigade relinquished their areas of operation the support and control of these projects were officially turned over to District, Province, and MACV officials.

(2) As individual units within the Brigade began standdown, many salvage materials and supplies became available to the Brigade S-5. After a coordination meeting with the Province S-5 and S-5 Advisor, the decision was made to route all requests for materials through the Province Chief for control. All individuals and organizations requesting materials were referred to the Province Chief who either approved or disapproved the letter or request. Approved requests were authorized whenever possible. Each group receiving material or dismantling vacant buildings were required to be accompanied by at least one US personnel to insure base security.

b. Psychological Operations:

ANNEX F (Civil-Military Operation) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORICLE (BRAVO)

(1) In Quang Tri Province psychological operations have traditionally been conducted by the Province S-5 in the populated areas and by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) in the tactical areas. For this reason Psyops and information concerning the redeployment of the Brigade was disseminated through Province channels.

(2) Prior to redeployment, one HE (audio visual) team from Det. 2, 7th Psyop Battalion was attached to MACV Team #19 for utilization by the Province S-5 and Advisor. This team worked a Province wide schedule prepared by the Province S-5. During redeployment of the Brigade, the HE team continued to work on their regular schedule. Working with the support of the Vietnamese Information Service and the Province S-5, the main themes used were GVN strength and the capabilities of the GVN armed forces.

c. Kit Carson Scouts:

(1) When official notification of redeployment was received, all recruiting of Kit Carson Scouts ceased and assignments of recent Scout graduates to the units of the Brigade were discontinued. Those at the Center, at that time, were detained for security of the Center until the closing of the facility.

(2) As each unit in the Brigade entered standdown, the Kit Carson Scouts assigned to that unit were transferred to the Kit Carson Scout Center. The G-5, XXIV Corps, was notified of the number of Scouts the Brigade would have and when they would be available for reemployment with other units. The 101st Airborne Division (Aml) indicated a desire to recruit up to twenty Scouts. The remainder of the Scouts were terminated and paid severance pay where applicable.

(3) The following is the final disposition of the Scouts employed by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech):

| | |
|---|----|
| Recruited and employed by the 101st Airborne Division (Aml). | 19 |
| Bru Montagnards returned to Bru resettlement areas to join Province Recon Units and PSDF Units. | 15 |
| Local VC turned over to Chieu Hoi Center, Quang Tri City. | 24 |

ANNEX F (Civil-Military Operation) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

| | |
|--|----------|
| NVA turned over to National Chieu Hoi Center, Saigon. | 5 |
| Employed by MACV Team #19. | 4 |
| Employed by A Company 4/12 Cav. | 6 |
| Employed by 3/5 Cav. | 9 |
| Scouts found to have illegal draft status and turned over to Vietnamese Military Police. | <u>6</u> |
| TOTAL | 88 |

4. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Control and distribution of vacant buildings:

(1) As the civilian and military communities in the area realized that the Brigade was redeploying, many areas vacated, but not yet released by USARV for disposition, were stripped by military and civilian personnel.

(2) The problem could have been avoided if the length of time taken to release vacated buildings was reduced. This would enable local authorities to designate area of salvagable materials for Province approved organizations to collect and use for Civic Action Projects.

(3) Recommendations: That more advance planning be done to include anticipation of areas that will be available for salvage materials. Once the area is vacated by the using unit it should be made immediately available to the appropriate authorities for proper distribution to prevent stripping and black marketing of the materials.

b. Transfer of Equipment:

(1) Problem: All Psyops equipment is transferred according to direction received from USARV. In both cases of aerial broadcast equipment belonging to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), the equipment went to units already possessing such equipment. This left the Quang Tri area without an aerial broadcast system to support the operation in this area.

(2) Solution: This problem could have been prevented had there been a method for recommendations by the losing unit as to the future disposition

ANNEX F (Civil-Military Operation) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO)

of equipment. In the case of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), if the equipment had been transferred to the 1st ARVN Division, they then would have the capabilities to continue the Psyops effort in the Quang Tri Province area without dependance on US units.

(3) Recommendation: That disposition recommendations be solicited from redeploying/inactivating units.

5. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

13 June - Notification of redeployment.

01 July - Completed coordination with Province S-5 Advisor for distribution of salvagable materials.

07 July - Began releasing salvage buildings to Province approved organizations for Civic Action projects.

10 July - Relinquished all Psyop responsibilities to G-5 1st ARVN Division.

13 July - 101st Airborne Division (Aml) indicated desire to recruit and employ up to 20 Kit Carson Scouts from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

17 July - 101st Airborne Division (Aml) recruited and transported 19 Kit Carson Scouts to Camp Eagle.

18 July - G-5, XXIV Corps, notified this office that no other units in MR-1 had requirements for Kit Carson Scouts.

21 July - At 1300 hours the Kit Carson Scout Center was turned over to the RF/PF school.

All Kit Carson Scouts not recruited by the 101st were terminated and released.

Received instruction from USARV to transfer one aerial broadcast system to 7th Psyop Battalion.

26 July - Transferred one aerial broadcast speaker to G-5, 23rd Infantry Division, as directed by USARV.

30 July - Closed the Brigade Donor Deposit Fund.

02 Aug - Closed Civic Action/Psywar Fund.

13 Aug - Civic Action responsibilities for Quang Tri assumed by 101st Airborne Division (Aml); S-5 section closed.

ANNEX G (Signal) to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) After Action Report KEYSTONE ORIOLE (BRAVO).

1. GENERAL: The Brigade Signal Office began planning for standdown the last week in May by formulating a Signal Annex to the BDE OPLAN giving basic guide lines for standdown units. The research for this centered on USARV OPLAN 183-70 and later was expanded to include a detailed review of other KEYSTONE unit after action reports. Detailed planning and coordination continued throughout the redeployment period.

2. REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS:

a. Brigade organic communications would be maintained until cessation of operations and/or until relieved by non-brigade units.

b. Communications support for equipment processing locations would be planned and coordinated by the Signal Section.

c. After standdown of the 298th Signal Company had been completed, base camp communications would be provided by 1st Signal Brigade units.

d. COMSEC material would be returned to the COMSEC logistics support unit in Phu Bai, transferred to other accounts, or destroyed as appropriate.

e. Units would drop out of Brigade nets as they stood down.

f. The supporting 1st Signal Brigade unit would be standing down during the increment.

g. Photographic and public address support would be provided by SEAPIC.

h. The MARS station would be maintained as long as possible.

i. Perimeter defense communications would be maintained throughout the standdown period.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. COMSEC:

(1) Few problems were encountered in the turn-in and processing of tactical COMSEC equipment within the Brigade. At the beginning of the standdown period all units turned in equipment excess to their needs. This gave the repairman sufficient time to prepare the equipment and paperwork for transfer to the 7th GLSU in Phu Bai. Initially, some equipment was overlooked requiring damage certificates, but this problem was resolved after the first turn-in. The sudden departure of the COMSEC Custodian on emergency leave and subsequent PCS reassignment on 17 July 71 initially caused no major problems. However, at

the end of the Brigade's standdown period, it required the Signal Officer to travel to Long Binh and close the account. At the same time, his presence was required to monitor the reconfiguration of the Quang Tri communications system resulting from standdown operations of the 588th Signal Company.

(2) COMSEC equipment for those units remaining in RVN was transferred to the gaining command and re-hand receipted back to the units. This was necessary because the remaining units were in the process of moving and an approved crypto facility could not be established to permit the creation of separate sub-accounts.

(3) During the turn-in period 400 accountable issued items were either turned in or transferred to the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). Approximately 250 accountable repair assemblies were turned in and 2000 codes and keylists and 50 CRYPTO manuals were destroyed.

(4) The AUTOSEVOCOM terminal posed a special problem since part of the TOC would have to be dismantled to remove it. Because of the availability of organic Engineer support the dismantling process was to have begun on 20 July 71; however the decision was made to transfer the assets to the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) which was accomplished on 30 July 71.

b. Area Communication Support: The initial USARV standdown schedule announced the standdown of the 588th Signal Company, the 1st Signal Bde area support unit, in the first two weeks of the increment with the 298th Signal Company standing down at the end of the increment. This created a situation in which the unit providing area support would be standing down when communications requirements would be at peak levels thereby requiring 298th Signal Company to expand support to non-Brigade units. The problem of timing of the phase-out of Signal units was discussed with the Signal representative on the USARV URAT team on 24 June, and together with Da Nang Support Command, a compromise was reached in which the 298th stood down in the middle of the increment, and the 588th at the end of the increment. Because of the late coordination, the 298th was only given a two day turn-in period.

c. MARS: The MARS station was scheduled to be closed on the 20th of July; however 3/5 Cav initiated a request to assume the station and it was transferred to them on 18 July 71. This permitted continuous MARS coverage throughout the standdown period. To provide continuity in the operations all of the assigned operators were transferred to the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL).

d. Brigade Internal Communications: All VHF Systems were deactivated with the closure of 1/11 Inf and 1/61 Inf (M) to QTCB on 11 July 71. On that date the Brigade went OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and the Bde RATT Net was closed, with the NCS coming up as a station in the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) General Purpose RATT Net.

e. MACV Critical Circuits: The passing of OPCON for the Brigade to the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) permitted deletion from the JCS Red Rocket AIG on 14 July 71. Upon notification of deletion, one of the two TTY circuits to XXIV Corps was deactivated, with the second one remaining in until 30 July 71. The AIG deletion not only decreased manning requirements in the communications center, but also relieved the command pressure associated with MACV critical circuits. This was particularly significant since the 298th Signal Company lost through normal DEROS their TTY repairmen, and as the parts supply were depleted in the DS unit, equipment malfunctions became more and more frequent.

f. Photographic and PA Support: Initially it was planned to have SEAPIC provide all of this support. However, a public address set was hand-receipted from 108th Arty Gp and it was used for the 12 rehearsals and ceremonies. PA support for the Brigade ceremony itself was provided by the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL), using the hand-receipted set as back-up. Photographic support was provided by the Brigade Photo facility until it closed on 8 July 71. After that time, pictorial coverage was provided by Brigade assets with developing and processing handled through the SEAPIC detachment in Phu Bai.

g. Base Defense Communications: Equipment used for the extensive wire communications was transferred to the gaining units assuming base camp defense responsibilities. Much of the equipment was provided out of excesses within the Brigade which permitted turn-in of TO&E equipment on schedule. Some problems were experienced during the end of the standdown period because records of the wire lines were not passed from unit to unit as the responsibilities changed.

h. Message Traffic and Courier Service: The Brigade requested deletion on all USARV and XXIV Corps AIGs effective 29 July 71. However after that date messages continued to come in from 7th AF units as well as DIA AIGs. Messages to the originators of the traffic eliminated the problem. Brigade courier service furnished by the 298th Signal Company ceased on 28 July 71. After that time a courier was operated by the AG section to carry messages to and from the area communications center.

i. Switchboard Service: The extensive overlapping coverage of the Brigade switchboard and the Quang Tri Army switchboard permitted a smooth closing of "Red Devil" board on 24 July 71. Only 20 telephones had to be transferred; numbers changed were strapped at the Frame thus eliminating the requirement for outside installation work. Two Dynamic trunks, USARV EAC, and two Kangaroo trunks were transferred to the area board to provide continuity of service.

j. Communications Support for Processing Centers: Three dedicated circuits were activated to facilitate the standdown process. One to Tan My Ramp (the trans-shipment point for sea movement of tracked vehicles), one to the Keystone processing unit in Da Nang, and one to Long Binh. All of these were placed on the area switchboard to minimize disruptions caused by the closing of Red Devil switchboard.

k. Transfer of Assets to ARVNAF: The cable plant and frame operated by the 298th Signal Company was transferred in its entirety to the ARVN. Coordination was effected in mid-July with the 1st ARVN Signal Officer, and cable records, as well as a joint "walk thru" inspection of the outside plant facilitated a smooth transition. The cable involved consisted of one-half mile of 300 pair multi-legged cable. Considerable coordination was initiated with XXIV Corps, USAAG DNG, USAARV and MACV to transfer two AN/MRC-69s to the 1st ARVN Division. However, the ARVN Signal Supply Battalion refused the equipment after making a technical inspection.

4. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Continuity of Key Personnel:

PROBLEM: The Brigade Signal Officer DEROS'd on 3 June 71 and was not replaced until 23 June 71. During the 20 day lapse the Commanding Officer of the 298th Signal Company "doubled" as the Signal Officer. The "two hatted" functioning took him away from the company during the critical time when he should have been permitted to delve into personnel problems, tightening controls on his property, developing turn-in schedules of equipment, and becoming thoroughly familiar with the Brigade OPLAN 183-70. Although it was known that the 588th Signal Company providing area support was included in the standdown increment, the acting Signal Officer did not have the experience or the time to effect the necessary coordination with 12th Signal Group or XXIV Corps to develop the realistic standdown schedule for the two companies. During his tenure there were two complete compromises of the Brigade SOI as well as a loss of cryptographic material which occurred when a radio relay site was overrun. The situation was worsened when the company commander was permitted to depart on 14 day CONUS leave the day prior to the incoming Signal Officer's arrival. This left the company with two officers, one the PBO and the other a 10 day loss. This lapse of leadership caused personnel and equipment turn-in problems which plagued the company throughout standdown.

LESSON LEARNED: During the critical planning periods for redeployment there must be continuity in key personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That key personnel slots be filled during the initial phases of redeployment. That key personnel not be permitted to take 14 day leaves during the planning phases of redeployment.

b. Transfer of Equipment to ARVNAF:

PROBLEM: In one of the planning meetings concerning the transfer of AOs the DCG of the 1st ARVN Division expressed a desire to obtain two AN/MRC-69s from the 298th Signal Company. The ARVNs did not initiate a request for this equipment through their channels until the Brigade advised ALCON of the request.

After two weeks of coordination with Advisory Personnel, USARV, and MACV the ARVN Signal Supply Battalion refused to accept the equipment because of poor condition. During subsequent coordination visits the Signal Officers assigned to the 1st ARVN Division requested the transfer of one AN/MTC-1 and a SB-86 Switchboard. During this visit it appeared that the advisory personnel were tacitly approving the obvious "shopping" for equipment. The requests for switchboards was disapproved by MACV J46.

LESSON LEARNED: Advisory personnel are not completely familiar with the procedures of obtaining approval of transfers of equipment directly from US units. Transfer of equipment is impossible unless it has been coordinated and initiated through the advisory chain of command.

RECOMMENDATION: That advisory personnel be thoroughly briefed on staff procedures required for transferring equipment from US to ARVN units. That advisory personnel discourage on the ground "shopping" for equipment.

c. Stopping AIG Address Listing Traffic:

PROBLEM: IAW Annex G of USARV OPLAN 183-70, the Brigade requested deletion from USARV AIG's. However, the traffic initiated by non-USARV units was not stopped, particularly from 7th AF units and DIA, Washington.

LESSON LEARNED: The only positive way to insure that all traffic is sent out under address listings or AIG's is cut off to review the traffic terminated in the communications center for one week. This will identify the daily and weekly summaries sent out using AIG's.

RECOMMENDATION: That USARV coordinate directly with 7th AF elements as each increment is announced to automatically terminate AIG traffic. In addition, units standing down should coordinate directly with their servicing communications center to identify the traffic as well as task the using staff sections to notify the originators of the traffic when it can be shut off.

5. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

- 25 May 1971: Commenced Redeployment Planning.
- 12 Jun 1971: Signal Annex to OPLAN 183-70 to S3
- 23 Jun 1971: Bde OPLAN 183-70 published.
- 24 Jun 1971: USARV URAT team arrived.
- 28 Jun 1971: Received revised standdown schedules for 298th and 588th Sig Co.
- 07 Jul 1971: Photographic processing lab closed.
- 10 Jul 1971: Three dedicated circuits activated; one each to Da Nang, Tan My Ramp, and Long Binh DTE.
- 11 Jul 1971: Deactivated VHF systems to C2 and FSB ANNE. Closed Bde RATT net. Activated stations in three 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) FM nets (secure) and G.P. RATT net.

- 14 Jul 1971: Began turn-in of COMSEC equipment to 7th CLSU, Phu Bai. Bde, deleted from RED ROCKET AIG; discontinued one TTY circuit to XXIV Corps. Planning conference with 1st Signal Brigade representatives and 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) on phase out of communications support. Planning visit with 1st ARVN Division Signal Officer.
- 15 Jul 1971: COMSEC Custodian departed on emergency leave. ARVN re-broadcast started.
- 17 Jul 1971: 298th Signal Company began moving equipment to Da Nang.
- 24 Jul 1971: Red Devil Switchboard deactivated.
- 28 Jul 1971: 298th Signal Company commenced standdown.
- 30 Jul 1971: TOC communications facility closed. Admin/Log and Bde Secure continued with hand-receipted assets. AUTOSEVCOM transferred to 101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
- 05 Aug 1971: Bde FM nets closed.
- 12 Aug 1971: Brigade Signal Office closed.

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1. GENERAL: Responsibilities of the Brigade Engineer during redeployment may be summarized as follows:

- a. Staff supervision of redeployment from fire bases in the Brigade TAOR.
- b. Staff supervision of redeployment from Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases.
- c. Transfer of real property to ARVN and/or PA&E.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Redeployment Planning Group: The principal activity of the engineer as part of the RPG was the preparation of the Engineer Annex for Redeployment, which included:

- (1) Facilities Clearance Procedures.
- (2) Procedures for fire base turnover.
- (3) Guidance to units concerning Engineer support during redeployment.

b. Minor Base Transfer: Mai Loc, FSB C-2 and A-4, and the Kit Carson Scout School were transferred as outlined in Para 5a, Chronology of Events. Their transfers were reported in writing to XXIV Corps G-4 Real Estate IAW MACV Reg 700-26, and XXIV Corps Reg 700-2.

c. Minefield Transfer: IAW XXIV Corps msg 281008Z Jun 71 (C), known existing minefields in the Brigade's AO were transferred, as appropriate, to XXIV Corps, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), and 1st ARVN Div (Fwd). In addition, IAW above-cited msg and FM 20-32, responsibility for minefields surrounding FSB C-2 and A-4 was formally transferred to the 1st ARVN Div.

d. Land Use Concurrences:

(1) Copies of the complete record of LUC's in the Brigade's AO were transferred to XXIV Corps and the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) on 27 July 71.

(2) LUC's held in the Brigade's AO were reviewed, and those deemed no longer required were cancelled. Those LUC's cancelled were for Wunder Beach, a borrow pit near LZ Sharon, and an abandoned MACV compound between LZ Sharon and QL-1. This early review varies from standard procedure, which calls for cancellation of LUC's, as appropriate, upon completion of the property transfer process. In this case, however, the relatively minor task of cancellation of excess LUC's early in the process provided

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experience in LUC cancellation, and an overall grasp of the status of
all LUC's held in the Brigade's AO.

e. Facilities Clearance Control:

(1) A Clearance Control Team, headed by the Brigade Engineer, conducted clearance inspections of all units, Brigade and non-Brigade, that departed Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases from 1 July to 15 August 1971. This inspection ensured that unit areas were free of government equipment or supplies, contained no security violations, and were properly closed and policed.

(2) As part of each unit commander's clearance procedure, he was required to certify that his area contained no buried government equipment or supplies. In some instances, buried US Marine equipment was discovered in unit areas either by visual means or by minesweeps by A/7 Engineer Battalion. In these cases, the unit commander was not required to excavate the equipment, but a record was made of the find.

f. Property Transfer, QTCB and DHCB (Refer to Para 5c and 5d, Chronology of Events): Beginning in late 1970, prior to formal inception of Brigade Redeployment, the Brigade Engineer had been involved in the planning of the consolidation of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Combat Bases. While this consolidation never occurred, the experience gained speeded the early stages of the property transfer of the 2 bases. Thus, planning for the transfer had a firm base when it was begun in earnest in late May. Coordination with 1st ARVN Div (Fwd) was begun in mid-June, and transfer actions initially proceeded smoothly. The proposed Property Transfer Plans (RCS: MACDC-13) for Dong Ha, originally submitted in November 1970, and the conceptual approval for the transfer of DHCB gained in March 1971 were still valid negating a need for resubmission of a MACDC-13 for DHCB. The MACDC-13 for QTCB, also submitted in November 1970, required only a message requesting reactivation. This was submitted on 25 June. The Property Transfer Plan for DHCB was submitted on 6 July, and it was then that the process for both bases encountered delay. It became apparent that I Corps was considering a significant input of troops in the northern MR-1 area, and both approval of the MACDC-14 for DHCB and submission of the MACDC-14 for QTCB were held in abeyance pending resolution of the ARVN's plans. During the month of July, coordination was established with 101st Abn Div (Ambl), to begin transfer of responsibility for the property transfer process. An Installation Coordinator, eventually to manage QTFOB, was established at QTCB in mid-July, and close liaison was initiated and maintained with him by Brigade Engineer. As the delay in resolution of the disposition of properties continued, it became apparent that the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) would have to assume responsibility for the latter stages of transfer of the 2 bases. To absorb this load, an officer from the Office

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of the Assistant Division Engineer, 101st, was established at QTCB at the beginning of August, reinforcing already close coordination established by this office with the ADE. During the first week in August, ARVN desires for the 2 bases were finalized, and it was established that DHCB would be donated/abandoned, and that ARVN would accept all of QTCB. The Brigade Engineer then prepared a draft of the Property Transfer plan (RCS: MACDC:14) for QTCB to reflect the latest of ARVN's wishes and gave it to the ADE, 101st for transmittal. Formal transfer of the 2 bases, and submission of both Property Transfer Reports (RCS: MACDC-15) was handled by PA&E, IALC, and the 101st Abn Div (Ambl). The change in transfer responsibility from 1/5 Mech to 101st Abn Div (Ambl) added further complication to an already difficult process. Every attempt was made to ensure a smooth transition. Concentration in the following areas paid off in a relatively trouble-free shift of responsibility:

- (1) Facilities Clearance Control.
- (2) Property Transfer Reports.
- (3) Land Use Concurrences.

3. PROBLEMS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Indecision, Disposition of Property, Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases:

(1) Lessons Learned: If the chronologies of events that deal with Property Transfer of Dong Ha and Quang Tri in para 5 below appear confused and redundant, it is because they were. The months of June and July were filled with reversals of position on what portions of which bases would be occupied by whom. The consequences of this apparent indecision is summarized below:

(a) Property Transfer Reports and Facilities Transfer Data: Both the Installation Engineer and the Installation Coordinator for Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases were forced to amend and resubmit reports to higher headquarters in response to changing ARVN wishes for properties at the 2 bases. Specifically involved were the 337 actions required of the Installation Engineer, and the MACDC - series of reports required of the Installation Coordinator. The latter was particularly affected, since the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) inherited responsibility for these reports at a time when most of the reports in the series would have been submitted, but due to changing plans for disposition of the 2 bases, had either not been submitted or were outdated.

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(b) External Security Planning: The several changes in plans for disposition of property at the 2 bases caused an equal number of fruitless planning exercises among elements of the 101st, 1st ARVN, and 1/5 Mech, reacting to each new disposition plan with a corresponding plan for external security at the 2 bases.

(c) Disposition of Areas to be Abandoned: The estimate of which areas on the 2 combat bases would be abandoned as of 1 September 1971 fluctuated wildly throughout the month of July. Responding to a general wish to dispose of abandoned areas of US property in a controlled fashion, 1/5 Mech established early coordination with the Quang Tri Province Chief to gain his assistance in conducting orderly material salvage operations in abandoned areas at the 2 combat bases. 1/5 Mech was forced to retract, in response to one change or another in the disposition plan, most of its promises of buildings to the Province Chief. Whereas it presently appears that there will be plenty of buildings for his needs, he must once again be convinced, this time by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl), to assist the US by dismantling abandoned buildings for public works projects. His response must be less enthusiastic than at first. The effects of the resultant relative lack of Province support cannot be measured, although control of abandonment depends directly upon the degree received of that support. However, it is certain that more uncontrolled stripping by ARVN/Vietnamese civilians will take place now; stripping and poor publicity that an earlier firm plan could have prevented.

(d) Recovery of Economically Recoverable Items: Indecision relating to disposition of DHCB put PA&E behind schedule in their recovery of items from that base, and into a time-frame which conflicted with their program for conducting a similar operation at Quang Tri. The situation was further complicated by the decision of the Northern District Engineer to remove the 526th Facilities Engineer Detachment to Phu Bai 4 weeks ahead of their redeployment schedule. This imposed a heavier workload on PA&E in the later stages of the recovery of items from the 2 bases at the most critical time for this operation.

(e) Generator Transfer to ARVN: In order to gain the transfer of electrical generators as part of a property transfer, ARVN must submit an advisor-validated requirement for power based on their proposed use of the property transferred. These documents normally require 3 weeks of processing at MACV before authority for transfer is granted. Late changes in ARVN plans for disposition of the 2 bases cut this lead time to a matter of days, and in the one instance where no late change in plans took place (1/5 Mech HQ area), it was not until a month after the plan was known that the document was submitted, cutting lead time in this instance to 2 weeks.

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(2) Recommendations: The detrimental effects of delay in all of the above areas are not yet known: these effects may, however, be estimated on the basis of what is presented in Para (1) above. Clearly, in future redeployment/transfer situations, an early determination of specific disposition of properties will go a long way toward eliminating the problems cited in Para (1) above.

b. Internal Security, Vacated Areas:

(1) Lessons Learned: The interim security of vacated unit areas prior to their transfer was established as a matter of grave command concern, however, security of vacated areas at the 2 combat bases during the redeployment process was inadequate. Incidents of wholesale stripping by ARVN and Vietnamese civilians occurred. (See Chronology of Events, Para 5d, Item 24) 1/5 Mech could not, in its later stages of redeployment, secure vacant Brigade and non-Brigade unit areas at the 2 bases. 101st Abn Div (Ambl) assumed responsibility as Sub-zone Coordinator for all vacant unit areas on the 2 bases on 11 July 1971 and was formally tasked in XXIV Corps msg 230821Z Jul 71 (S) to develop plans for security of the 2 bases.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Early determination of disposition of properties is desirable to ensure good US/ARVN planning of internal security.

(b) In conjunction with Para (a) above, a phased transfer plan should be formulated that permits final disposition of real property, whether transfer/abandonment/donation, ASAP after the US unit vacates the area. In the case of transfer of facilities to ARVN, decisions to piecemeal transfer of property should weigh the advantage of the reduction of the US interim security commitment against the disadvantage of placing ARVN units adjacent to redeploying US units.

4. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

a. Minor Base Transfer:

(1) 25 June: Mai Loc transferred to elements of the 248th Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

(2) 8 July: FSB A-4 transferred to elements of the 2nd ARVN Rgt, 1st ARVN Inf Div.

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(3) 10 July: FSB C-2 transferred to elements of the 2nd ARVN Rgt,
1st ARVN Inf Div.

(4) 21 July: Kit Carson Scout School transferred to Quang Tri
Province Headquarters.

b. Minefield Transfer:

(1) 6 July: minefield records for FSB A-3, A-4, and C-2 were
transferred to the Engineer Office at HQ, XXIV Corps.

(2) 6 July: minefield records for Ca Lu, Cam Lo District Headquarters,
Gio Linh, FSB A-2, A-3, A-4, C-1, and C-2 were transferred to the Assistant
Division Engineer, 101st Abn Div (Ambl).

(3) 9 July: responsibility for minefields at FSB C-2 and A-4 were
transferred to elements of the 2nd Rgt, 1st ARVN Inf Div.

(4) 9 July: minefield records for FSB A-2, A-3, A-4, and C-2 were
transferred to Headquarters, 1st ARVN Inf Div (Fwd).

c. Transfer, Quang Tri Combat Base (Note: all references to "QTCB"
by implication include Camp Roberts. Message descriptions are partial):

(1) XXIV Corps Msg 140510Z Oct 70 (C): requested preparation of
Property Transfer Report (RCS: MACDC-13) for Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat
Bases.

(2) 1/5 Mech Msg 071425Z Nov 70 (C): was Proposed Property Transfer
Report (RCS: MACDC-13) for QTCB.

(3) 24 Jun 71: PA&E team conducted facilities survey, QTCB, to
update facilities records for the base.

(4) 24 Jun 71: meeting at Quang Tri with MAJ Clifton, USAECIV Real
Estate, with a USARV Redeployment Assistance Team. MAJ Clifton stated that
to proceed with the transfer of QTCB, only a message reactivating Item 2
above was necessary.

(5) 1/5 Mech Msg 250550Z Jun 71 (C): was a request for reactivation
of Item 2 above; stated transfer/closure of QTCB would take place in 2 phases:
1. transfer/closure of QTCB except the area surrounding the airfield, 2.
transfer/closure of the airfield area.

(6) XXIV Corps Msg 290750Z Jun 71 (C): forwarded information in
Item 5 to USARV.

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(7) COMUSMACV 030750Z Jul 71 (C): granted conceptual approval to transfer QTCB; stated that the facility would be utilized by a Rgt of the 1st Inf Div: that US would retain a forward operating base at QTCB.

(8) XXIV Corps Msg 040901Z Jul 71 (C): was sent to CG I Corps and MR-1; defined limits by coordinate of QTFOB; requested following information ASAP: 1. proposed ARVN utilization, QTCB, less QTFOB, 2. electrical power requirement.

(9) XXIV Corps Msg 070630Z Jul 71 (C): approved 101st Abn Div (Aml) stationing plan for establishment of QTFOB.

(10) XXIV Corps Msg 080823Z Jul 71 (C): requested that Northern District Engineer provide a list of economically recoverable items and the amount of time estimated required to recover them, for all of QTCB except QTFOB, were QTCB to be abandoned.

(11) 9 July 71: Joint Coordination Meeting held at HQ, 1/5 Mech, principally between LTC Ready, 101st liaison with 1st ARVN Div, and COL Chung, CO, 1st ARVN Div (Fwd). Questions concerning security of the new perimeter, the POL farm, the ASP, and the TOC were raised.

(12) 11 July 71: Joint Coordination Meeting held at HQ, 1/5 Mech, principally between BG Hamlet, ADC(S), 101st, and BG Gial, DC, 1st ARVN Div. At this meeting, the questions raised on 9 July were settled as follows:

(a) ASP 101 would be closed and levelled by the US.

(b) The US would abandon the tank farm and take out the pumps that render it operational.

(c) The US would supply materials for ARVN construction of the western portion of the QTCB perimeter.

(d) The US/ARVN boundary of QTFOB was modified to give ARVN the 298th Signal Co. and A/75th Spt Bn areas.

(e) The US would retain, maintain, and operate the central water point, whose distribution system supplies all of QTCB.

(f) In addition, 28 July 71 was set as the date on which final disposition of the remainder of QTCB would be declared.

(13) XXIV Corps Msg 110344Z Jul 71 (C): granted conceptual approval to transfer QTCB.